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The method  a central  government  uses  to transfer  funds  to local
iurisdictions  can greatly  affect  a country  's development  efforts.
But the effects  of the  transfers  are seldom  analyzed,  resulting  in
intergovernmental  grant  systems  that  fail  to achieve  their  desired
objectives.
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A country's grant system is the product of its  national income or equalize living standards by
political environment.  Such systems tend to de-  helping govemments deliver public services in
velop over time in response to current political  economically depressed areas.
needs and then become institutionalized. Since
they have developed in a haphazard faslhion  over  Since transfers may be seen locally as
time, grant "systems" commonly are not systems  "costless" gifts from the higher level of govern-
at all.  Hard-pressed government ministries  ment, there is little pressure on localities to
seldom undertake any thorough analysis of these  mobilize resources of their own or to spend the
arrangements, hence their overall impact is  funds efficiently.  Few developing countries
unknown in spite of the importance of this use of  have tht; resources to conduct audits to ensure
resources.  the accountability of local govenunent spending.
Grants from central governments become  The goal of assisting decentralized decision-
more important sources of local revenue as local  making by transferring funds to local units can
govemments are expected to play larger roles in  also conflict with the objective that central
the provision of public services.  govemment revenues be spent efficiently.
Decentralization implies local control over the
Grants are used in hopes of achieving a wide  use of funds; the desire for effective use of
variety of goals.  One common rationale for  centrally collected funds calls for considerable
intergovemmental grants is to redistribute  oversight of local spending.
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Intergovernmental fiscal relations encompass a wide variety of issues
including service responsibilities, revenue schedules, budget procedures,
employment conditions, electoral processes and conduct of local officials.
Yet, consideration of the trans,er of financial resources between levels of
government  probably  dominates  both  positive  and  normative  analyses of
intergovernmental affairs.  Seldom are lower level governments fully self-
financing and  the flow of funds from higher levels can have significant
effects on the spatial allocation and use of public sector resources as
well  as  determine the fiscal  viability of  local jurisdictions.  Since
economic development efforts are always dispersed spatially throughout a
nation  and oftentimes  include a role  for local government institutions,
intergovernmental  grant  policies  are commonly of considerable importance to
the  development  efforts  of  higher  levels  of  government;  ard  since  transfers
may  be  one  of  the  most  important  revenues  of  local  jurisdictions, their
financial  health  can  be  dramatically affected by these policies.  The topic
is, therefore,  of considerable  concern in  all  countries  that  rely  upon
multiple tiers of public sector institutions.
1Throughout  this  paper  the  terms  higher  level  of goverrment will refer
generally  to  the  central  government  in  unitary  states  and  either  the
central or second tier governments, i.e., provirnces  or states, in federal
systems;  likewise, lower level governments will generally refer to local
governments or to provinces or states in federal systems.2
This paper has several objectives.  One simply is to review the size
and  trands  in  intergovernmental  grant  prog.ams  in  a  fairly  large  group  of
developing  countries.  In  attempting  to  carry  out  such  a  review,  howevesr,
it is  necessary  first  to  discuss  what  is meant  by  intergovern6.ental
grants--a task complicated by the assortment of institutional arrangements
used in developing countries for providing public services.  The concepts
and ampirical importance of grants are  considered in the following section.
A  second  purpose  is  to  review  the  objectives  of  intergovernmental
grant  schemes  and  evaluate  the  instruments  that  might  be  used  to  accomplish
these  objectives.  But  just  as  there  is  a  vartety  of  institutional
arrangements  across  countries,  there  is  also  a  mt  icity  of  objectives
commonly  sought  for  intergovernmental  grants.  Furthermore,  these
objectives are not neces3arily identical when viewed by the recipient and
granting  governments.  The  second  section  of  the  paper  reviews the
different  transfer  mechanisms  available  to  granting  governments and
indicates  how  each may  promote  or  may  detract  from  these  alternative
objectives.
There  can  be  considerable  differences  between  the  theoretical  design
of a grant  system  and  the  way  it  is  actually  administered.  Not  only  are
grant  systems  seldom  designed  in  the  way  a public  finance  theorist  might
prescribe,  actual  practices  often  differ  substantially  from  the  statutory
basis  of  the  system. Finally,  while  the  data  are  scanty,  there  have  been
several  attempts  to  assess  the  effects  of  specific  intergovernmental  grant
schemes  on  localities.  The  third  section  reviews  these  studies  as  well  as3
those that describe  the current  intergovernmental  transfer  practices  in
specific  countries.
The concluding  seetion  at^tempts  to draw lessons  from this review  of
intergovernmental  grant  thecry  and  practice  in the  developing  world. While
some  recommendations  can  be  made,  additional  research  on  this  important
topic  is in  order.
Concepts  of  and  Empirical  Evidence  on
Intergovernmental  Grants
Although  much of this  paper  is concerned  with the impact  of grants  on
lower  level  governments,  the  ultimate  purpose  of  such  monetary  transfers  is
to finance local public services.  The issue facing these sub-national
governments is obtaining the resources necessary to meet  the many
expenditure  needs  that  the  citizenry  of  the  locality  demand  or  that  are
mandated  by  the  higher  level  of  government.  As  the  service  needs  of  local
areas  expand  due  to  increased  population,  rising  prices  or  increased
demands  for  pulblic  services,  there  are  even  greater  pressures  on  the  sub-
national  governments  to  increase  spending.
There  is  only  a  finite  number  of  sources  from  which  lower  level
governments  can  derive  funds.  The locality may mobilize resources
internally,  primarily  through  the use of tax  instruments  or user charges,
or it may derive  revenues  from external  sources,  especially  via transfers
from other levels  of government  or from loans.  With increased  spending
needs,  local  governments  must attempt  to obtain  greater  yields  from these
several  sources.4
It is  commonly  anticipated  that  grants  are  likely  to take  on increased
importance in the revenue structures of local governments  over time. 2
Whether this has or will occur depends  upon the income,  population  and
inflation  elasticities  of grants  vis-a-vis  local taxes  and user charges.
Revenues  from  taxes  which  are  most  commonly  reserved  for  local  governments,
e.g., property  and local  business  taxes,  generally  are not found  to grow
automatically.  Instead the structure of these levies  often  require
discretionary  changes  in  tax  rates  to  realize  revenue  growth. 3 The  same  is
generally  true  for  user  charges. Rather  than  attempt  to impose  politically
unpopular  tax increases,  local  leaders  are likely  to turn  to higher  level
authorities  and  urge  an increased  flow  of intergovernmental  grants.
Whether  or not  such please  are successful  will depend  upon political
decisions  made by the granting  government. While there is little  doubt
that the  fiscs of most developing  countrieo  are strapped  for funds,  it is
also argued  that higher  level governments  commonly  retain  broader-based,
more  elastic  revenue  sources  "or  themselves.  If  revenues  do,  in  fact,
2See,  for  example,  Kenneth  J.  Davey,  Financing  Regional  Government:
International  Practices  and  Their  Relevance  to the  Third  World  (Chichester:
John  Wiley  and  Sons,  1983),  p.  131.
3For a  review  of local  revenue  elasticity  in  developing  countries,  see
Larry  Schroeder and  Elizabeth  Dalton,  "Local  Government  Tax  Revenue
Buoyancy  and  Stability  in  Developing  Countries,"  Regional  Development
Dialogue,  Vol.  7  (Autumn  1986),  pp.  32-33.
4Davey,  Financing  Regional  Government: International  Practices  and
Their  Relevance  to the  Third  World.  See, however, Edward B. Prpntilla,
"Financing  Local  and Regional  Development:  A Preliminary  Survey  of
Comparative  Performance  of  Selected  Countries"  (Nagoya:  United  Nations
Centre  for  Regional  Development,  1984),  p.  52,  who  reports  higher  tax
buoyancy  coefficients  for  local  than  for  central  governments. The  results
probably  reflect  tax  rate  and  base  policy  changes  made  by  local  governments
rather than inherently  more elastic  revenue  sources used by lower-level
jurisdictions.5
grow  more rapidly  at the  center  and if growing  local  spending  requirements
are to be met, there  will be the need for increased  flows  of funds  from
higher  to lower  levels  of  government.
Whether  or not gram.s  ave been taking  on a more prominent  role in
developing  countries  during  the  recent  past  is  an empirical;  unfortunately,
as is so often  the case  with financial  information  on local  governments  in
developing  countries, the data necessary ta examine  these trends  are
scarce.  Furthermore,  there  are  some  important  conceptual  issues
surrounding  the  definition  of intergovernmental  grants.
Measurement  Issues
Since different  revenue  administration  arrangements  are utilized  in
developing  countries,  issues arise  concerning what  is, in fact, an
intergovernmental  transfer.  Taxes  imposed and collected  by a local
Jurisdiction  are  most  reasonably  considered  own  source  revenues  even  though
it is often the case that lower level governments  have no autonomy  in
determining  the  tax rates imposed  or in defining  the tax  base.  The issue
is less clear  cut when one level  of government  collects  the tax and then
distributes  the  proceeds  to another  governmental  body.  The International
Monetary  Fund,  which probably  provides  the  most extensive  and  complete  set
of data  on public  sector  finances  throughout  the  world,  uses the  following
guideline:
"...it  may  be  useful  to  attribute  tax  revenues  to
noncollecting  beneficiary  governments (1) when they have
exercised  some influence  or discretion  over the setting  of6
the tax or distribution  of its proceeds;  or (2)  when under
provisions  of the  tax  law they  automatically  receive  a given
percentage  of  the tax  collected  or  arising  in  their
territory;  or (3)  when they receive  tax  revenue  under 3 tax
law leaving  no discretion  to the  collecting  government."
Under this definition,  revenues  collected  by the central  government
but  transferred  directly  to  the  local  government  in  which  the  revenues  were
collected are  classified as  tax revenues of the beneficiary  (local)
government  rather  than as an intergovernimental  grant.  Such tax sharing
arrangements  are  quite  common  in developing  countries,  particularly  because
higher  levels  of government  may  be  able to collect  the  tax more
economically  than  can  local  governments. Such  arrangements  are  in essence
intergovernmental  transfers  since,  most  commonly,  it is  the  higher  level  of
government  which unilaterally  determines  this tax sharing arrangement.
Because of this definitional  issue, comparisons  of the role of grants
across  cour.cries  and  even  across  time  within  a single  country  must  be  made
cautiously.
Another conceptual issue that  arises when making  intercountry
comparisons  in intergovernmental  transfers  concerns  the discretion  which
the  local  government  has  in  spending  the  proceeds  of  the  transfer.  In  some
countries  organizations  called  local  governments  are little  more  than
agencies  of  the  central  government  with  all  or  nearly  all  public  employees
of these organizations  being employees  of the central government,  with
spending  decisions  made  with  little  direct  influence  by  locally-elected
5International  Monetary  Fund,  A Manual  on  Government  Finance
Statistics,  (Washington,  DC:  IMF,  1986),  p.53.officials and with  little or  no local discretion allowed in determining
revenues.  Again, the issue is not well-defineu.  While  the most telling
feature  to  distinguish  regional  and  local  governments  from  agencies of the
central  government  is  "autonomy",  the  various  degrees  of  autonomy  observed
in  different  countries  does  not  lead  to  a  ciear  demarcation  between
subnational  governments  and  deconcentrated  agencies  of  the  central
government.  Defining the flows of funds as intergovernmental  transfers is,
therefore, equally difficult.
These  definitional  issues  are  particularly  troublesome in those
countries  with  a  francophone  administrative  tradition.  While  local
jurisdictions exist, they are little more than administrative linits. Tax
revenues  of  the  locality  are  collected  by  the  central  government,
additional direct expenditures are  made  by  the  central  government  through
these  local  governments  and  all  or  nearly  all  "local"  employees  are
directly under the authority of  the center.  Still, there are instances
where  the  local  jurisdiction  is  expected  to  take on  additional  public
service provision responsibility. 6
Importance  of Grants to Granting Governments
The  role  of  grants  can  be  measured  in  at  least  two  different  ways--
with  respect  to  the  revenues  of  the  recipient  government  and  relative  to
total  spending  activity  of  the  granting  jurisdiction.  While  the former
See, for example, Local Revenue Administration Project, Local Revenue
Administration in  Burkina Faso.  Phase II.  Final Report,  Metropolitan
Studies  Program  Monograph  No.  17,  The  Maxwell  School  (Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University, August 1985 [revised  January 1986]).8
approach  (discussed  below)  can provide  a better  perspective  on the degree
to which  lower  levels  of  government  are  fiscally  dependent  upon  the  actions
of the  granting  government,  the latter  indicator  suggests  the willingness
of the  granting  government  to  give  up  at  least  some  control  over  the  actual
utilization  of funds.  The changing role of grants over time and in
response  to changing  external  economic  and financial  conditions  can also
provide some indication  of the importance  accorded  to lower levels of
goverrment  by the  higher  level.
While there  are  obviously  weaknesses  in the data  due  to nonuniformity
'n the  meaning  of grants  across  countries  and due to the previously-noted
problems  associated with  tax  sharing arrangements, one  reasonably
consistent  source  of data is the  Government  Finance  Statistics  Yearbook  of
the International  Monetary  Fund.  Table 1 displays  the relative  size of
transfers  (current  plus  capital)  in  total  central  government  expenditures
for  both  1974  and  1984  in  a  nonrandom  sample  of  15  Third  World  countries.
Shown  also are the median  percentages  for each year-  and an indication  of
whether  the  percentages  rose  or  fell  during  the  period.
Drawing broad-based generalizable conclusions from such data is
unwarranted  due to the arbitrary  choice  of this small  sample;  it is also
difficult  because  of the variability  in the entries  shown.  The ratios
range from 0.8-24.0  percent in 1974 and from 1.3-28.7  percent  in 1984.
Although  the median  percentages  declined  slightly,  six of the individual
countries reveal some increase in the relative importance  of transfer
programs.9
TABLE  1
TRANSFERS  TO OTHER  LEVELS  OF GOVERNMENT  IN
SELECTED  COUNTRIES,  1974  AND 1984
Transfers  as Percent  of  Total
Expenditures  of Gganting
Government  GDP
Inorease  (+)  or  Buoyancy
Country  1974  1984  Decrease  (-)  Coefficients
Argentina  10.5  6.6  1.09
Bolivia  5.7  1.3  0.74
Botswana  6.9  8.4  +  1.49
Brazil  13.7  11.1  - 0.98
Chile  9.5  3.0  - 0.30
Indonesia  18.6  17.8  - 1.32
Kenya  7.0  3.2  _  0.27
Korea  24.0  28.7  +  1.57
Malawi  6.5  6.5  o  1.37
Mauritius  3.8  4.1  +  1.96
Pakistan  8.3  9.8  +  1.52
Philippines  5.6  5.3  0.73
Thailand  13.3  3.5  0.16
Uruguay  0.8  1.7  +  2.03
Venezuela  12.8  13.2  +  1.37
Median  7.0  5.3
aCentral  government  transfers  only;  data  exclude  shared
taxes.
bComputed  as percentage  change  in t;ansfers  between  1974-
1984  relative  to percentage  change  in  GDP.
C1975 data.
_OURCE: International  Monetary  Fund,  Government  Finance
Statistics  Yearbook,  1984  and 1986  (Washington,  DC:
IMF,  1984 and  1986).10
One set of entries highlights the problem associated with the macro
approach  utilized  here.  By  far  the  largest  change  in the relative
importance  of  transfers  was  in Thailand  where  the  percent  of  central
government expenditures being allocated as transfers declined from over 13
percent to less than 4 percent.  This large change was due to the fact that
in FY  1981 the  Government  of  Thailand  shifted  the  responsibility  for
primary education  from  the local  government to the center with an  off-
setting reduction in central-to-local government transfers.7  Summary data
as shown here mask such policy chaiges.
Another  way  to  measure  the  relative  importance  of grants is to
consider their  importance within  the context of  the economy as a whole.
Such a measure depends upon two factors--the relative importance of  the
granting government within the economy and the willingness of the granting
government to allocate money through the grant system.  The final column of
Table 1 sumn.-rizes  changes in these factors by displaying the ouoyancy of
transfers  (as measured  by  the  IMF) relative  to GDP.  The entries  are
buoyancies  since  they  do  not necessarily  reflect  automatic changes  in
transfer programs  in response  vo changes in GDP;  instead, discretionary
choices regarding both the size of government and the relative importance
of grants each partially caused the changes.  Entries greater than unity
indicate  that  grant  programs  were  growing  more  rapidly  than  GDP  while
7The  World  Bank, Thailand:  Managing Public Resources for Structural
Adjustment (Washington,  DC:  The World Bank, 1984), p. 73.11
entries less than one suggest a lessening importance of grants in these
economies.
The results again are mixed and, as would be expected, the bulk of the
entries correspond to the changes in the relative importance of grants as
indicated  in  the  third  column  of  the  table.  Yet,  the  1.09 buoyancy
coefficient in Argentina, in spite of the decline in relative importance of
transfers,  indicates  that  government  expenditures,  as  a whole, were
increasing sufficiently faster than GDP such that the smaller proportion of
government spending devoted to grants could still result in an increase in
tne relative importance of  grants in the economy.  A similar result  is
found for Indonesia.  Still, the range of coefficients from Thailand's 0.16
to the 2.03 of Uruguay, illustrate the considerable variability in the flow
of transfer revenues over time.
Importance of Grants to Recipient Governments
Perhaps  the  more  common  way  of  thinking  about  the  importance  of
intergovernmental  transfers  in  a developing  country  is  to measure  the
proportion  of  grants  relative  to  total  revenues  or  expenditures  of
recipient governments.  Such proportions indicate the extent to which the
lower governments are at risk to unilateral decisions made by the granting
government  to  alter  the  flow  of  revenues.  It  is  sometimes  also  argued  that
the  relative  importance  of  grants  to  local  governments  are  indicative  of
the degree of autonomy which the lower level governments have and, hence,
constitute indicators of decentralization.  The underlying assumption in
8See, for example, W.S.  Kee, "Fiscal  Decentralization and  Economic
Development," Public Finance Quarterly (January 1977), pp. 79-97; Roy Bahl
and  Shyam  Nath,  "Public  Expenditure  Decentralization  in  Developing12
such  an  argument  is  that  when a  recipient  government  depends  heavily  upon
transfers,  greater  control  can  be  maintained  over  local  governments'
decisions.  While  there  is  little  doubt  that  grants  provide  the  potential
for  considerable  fiscal  control  by  the  granting  government,  simple
proportions  ignore  the  types  of  grants  used,  some  of  which  provide  more
control  than  others  (see  below).  The assumption  also  ignores  the  fact  that
other  factors,  such  as  expenditure  mandates  and  control  over  personnel
decisions,  also  can  play  especially  important  roles  in  local  government
decision  making.
So as  to  provide  some  comparative  perspective  across  several
countries,  Table  2  has  been  constructed  from  the  IMF  Government Finance
Statistics  data  for  both  1974  and  1984.  Since  shared  taxes  are  not
included  in  the  transfers,  the  data  do  not  fully  reflect  the  flow  of
revenues  under  considerable  direct  control  of  the  central  government.
Because  lower  level  governments  can  include  both  local  jurisdictions  and
intermediate  level  jurisdictions  such  as  states  or  provinces  in  federal
systems,  we distinguish  between  them wherever  available.  Again,  the  sample
was  chosen  arbitrarily  based  primarily  upon  data  availability.
Again,  the  results  do  not  suggest  overwhelming  evidence  that  there
have  been  signif  icant  increases  or  decreases  in  the  role  of
intergovernmental  transfers  in  developing  nations  nor  that  there  is  any
Countries,"  Environment  and  Planning,  Vol.  IV  (1986),  pp.  405-418;  or
Michael  Wasylenko,  "Fiscal  Decentralization  and  Economic  Development,"
Public  Budgeting  & Finance,  Vol.  7,  No.  4  (Winter  1987).13
TABLE  2
TRANSFERS  AS A PERCENT  OF RECIPIENT  GOVERNMENT
EXPENDITURES,  SELECTED  COUNTRIES
1974 AND  1984
Country  and  Lexel  Increase  (+)  or
of Government  1974  1984  Decrease  (-)
Bolivia  State  na  8.9  na
Local  na  43.3  na
Brazil  State  19.6  16.5
Local  60.5  62.8  +
India  State  32.7  33.0 b  +
Indonesia  State  81.3 95.9  +
Kenya  Local  22.6  46.3  +
Korea  State  50.0  na  na
Local  81.7  na  na
Malawi  Local  45.0  26.8  -
Mauritius  Local  67.2  84.8  +
Philippines  Local  na  41.7  na
Thailand  Local  71.8  43.2  -
Tunesia  Local  33.9  42.1  +
Uruguay  Local  12.3  8.5  -
Venezuela  Local  55.9  na  na
aThe  term "state"  is  used  to  refer  to an intermediate  level  of




SOURCE: International  Monetary  Fund,  Government  Finance  Statistics
Yearbook,  1984  and 1986  (Washington,  DC:  IMF,  1984  and
1986).14
uniform  reliance  upon higher  levels  of government  to finance  lower level
spending.  The majority  (six) of  the ten entries show increases  in
proportions  with  the  large  decline  in the  Thailand  percentage  attributable
to the  previously  noted  change  in  education  finance.
Greater  information,  albeit  less convenient  for  comparative  purposes,
can be obtained  in studies  of local  government  finance  within  individual
zountries. Using such data sources  eoes,  of course,  produce  a potential
bias since the very fact that transfers are sufficiently important to study
will likely  mean that  the  role  of grants  is greater  than  would  be found  in
a  random  sample  of  countries.  Nevertheless,  3ome interesting  trends  can  be
observed  from  such  a  nonrandom  sample.
A  variety  of  data  that  indicate  the  relative  fiscal  importance  of
grants  and shared  taxes  in ten selected  countries  for different  years  and
different  levels  of government  are displayed  in Table 3.  The data for
India  reveal  increased  reliance  upon  shared  taxes  at the  state  level  during
the last half of the 1970s with approximately  constant reliance upon
grants.  At the city  level  in India,  grants  and  shared  taxes  are  observed
to constitute only slightly more than one-quarter  of total revenues;
however,  this reliance  upon transfers is greater in the smaller urban
jurisdictions. Furthermore,  during  the 1974/75  - 1979/80  period,  real per
capita  grants  to  metropolitan  local  governments  in  India  grew  at  an  average
rate  of  9.3 percent  whereas  in  the  smaller  cities  the  growth  rate  was 19.0
percent suggesting  either a lack of local revenue buoyancy  in smaller15
TABLE  3
INDICATOR6  S?  IMPOt  ANCE  CE IN1EGcAJE144NAL  T1RAWM  T1O
ECIPIENWr  OOVER2RS, SELBMED  0oMuRIES,  VARIa;B  YEARS
_  ctry  Years  Indicatrs  Souroe
Idia
States  1974/75  Shared taxes  - 19 peroent  revens  (excluding  Gandhi
bmwr);
Grants  .16 percent  revenues 'excluding  brAriing)
1981/82  iwred  Taxes - 24 perent  revenues (excluding
borMroig);
Grants - 14 percent  revenues (excluding borrowing)
Cities  1979/80  Grants or shared taxes  - 27 pcxoent cf  recmtrent  Wcrld Bnk
revenues;  16 percent  in large  (> 1 million)  (1984)
cities;  31 percent  in  other  cities.
Ne'l  Rural  1985/86  Sured  taxes  - 22.3 peroent  of total  revenues  Sc*roeder aid
Districts  (n-8)  Grants - 71.1 percent cf  total  revenues  Wo7ry
Pkistan
Faral  Districts  1983/84  Grants as  Pereent of District  Revenis  Sc*roeder
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Districts  1980/81  Shared  taxes  - 49.4 peroent  cf  total  rvens  Bahl
Grants - 34.1 percent cf  total  revenues
Cities  1982/83  Sared  taxes  = 3.7 percent  Cf total  reverues  Sdroeder  (1985)
Crants  - 32.3 of total  revenues.
Malaysia
States  1981  Federal Erants - 28 percent of  total  revemiss  Gmdhi
Municipalities  1980  Grants  - 36 peroent cr total  revenues  Rashid
Districts  1980  Grants  - 54 percent  cf  total  revenues  Rashid16
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Ccuntry  Yea_  _  rs_  _oatcr_s  e_  _  _  _  _
Irnmesia
Provimee  1982/83  Ihatrstem  - 74.8 peroent  of  tocal  roAtine  S&roedir  (1987)
revenue
Trasfems  - 65.5 peroent  of  total  development
reviu  (excliuing  loans)
Regamy and  1982/83  IanTers  - 66.8 peroent  cf  total  routine
Murlcipal  revenues
ThanBers - 53.4  poerent  of  total  developuent
revenues  (excluding  loans)
Kc  a
AUL  Local  1982  LocaL  shared  taxes  - 20.8  percmnt cc  totaL  Ahn
Goverrment  revenues
3ubsidies  - 21.4  peroent  ca  total  revenue
Mexioc
States  1975  Revenue  Shari - 17.5 peroent  ca  totaL rewenue  Wcrld Bank
1984  Pevenue  Saring  - 62.8 peroent  cf  total  revenues  (1987)
xdcinipalities  1975  Revenue  Sharing  - 18.1 peroent  Cf total  revenies
1984  Revenue  Sharing - 62.9 percent  cf total  revenues
Feradcr
All LoWal  1971  Iramfers  - 33.3 pewoent  of  expenditwes  Greytak and
Gover'nut  1975  Tlrywfems  - 53.4 peroent  ar  expendltwues  Mendez
1980  Iransfers  76.6 peroent  of expenditures
1984  Tranrers  s  72.1 peroent  Cf expenditures
Nigeria
States  1976M? Shared  taxes  - 47 peroent of  totaL revenues  Gsndhi
crants  - 40 percent  of  total  revenues
1981  Sared  taxes  - 68 peroent  cf  total  revenues
Grarits  - 24 percent  c  total  revenues17
TABLE  3  (CCNT.),  Page 3
SXJICES:  Chocng  Yorg Ahn,  "Financing Local and  Regional Development: The  Case of  the  Republic of
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DELvid  Greytak and Victcr Mendez, "'fl'  Inpct  of Intergpverwmsital Grants on Local Govwrnrents
in  Febudor:  A Study of FCoAPAR,"  Metropolitan Studies  Prc  aam  Occasional Paper No. 106, The
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Larry Scroeder,  Raral Develcpnant Grarts  to Loal  Govnts  in  Asia,  Metropolitan Studies
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Department (Washington,  DC:  The Warld Pank, Jurie 1985).
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University,  August 1987).
Warld BEnk,  "Financing Urban Services  in  India,"  South Asia Urban and Water Supply Depertment
(mlmeo)  (1984).
Warld  Bank, "Financing Pakistan's  Provinmial Services:  Trends  and Issuss,"  Soth  Asia Promrams
Depert2mnt  (mineo) (1986).
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cities  or  a  policy  commitment  by  the  overlying  state  governments  to  support
these  smaller  jurisdictions. 9
The  Nepal  data  are  drawn  from  a  small  sample  of  eight  rural  district
panchayats. The sum of grants  and shared  (land-based)  taxes constituted
over  90 percent  of the total revenues in these rural districts  that
represent  both terai  and hill areas.  Obviously,  very little  reliance  is
placed  on own-source  revenue  mobilization  in  these  jurisdictions.
The  Pakistan  data are shown  for both  rural  local  governments
(districts)  and  provinces. The  district-level  data  emphasize  the  fact  that
under a  federal system each individual province  determines its own
intergovernmental relations.  Districts  in the  two  less developed
provinces--Buluchistan  and the North West Frontier  Province  (NWFP)--rely
considerably  more  on the  provincial  level  of government  than  is the  case  in
the  more  highly  developed  provinces. Similar  differences  are  observed  when
the importance  to provinces of federal tax shares  and grants from the
federal to provincial levels of government are  considered.  Again,
subnational  governments  in the  less developed  areas  of the country  are  not
required  to  mobilize  as  much  of their  own  revenues  as are  higher  income  and
more  urbanized  regions.
Districts  in  Bangladesh  are  shown  to  rely  upon  the  shared  property
transfer  tax  to  provide  them  with  nearly  one-half  of  total  revenues  with
grants  providing  an additional  one-third.  Reliance  upon  grants,
9The  World  Bank,  "Financing  Urban  Services  in  India,"  South  Asia  Urban
and  Water  Supply  Department  (mimeo),  1984.19
particularly  shared  taxes,  in a sample  of Bangladesh  cities  is  seen to be
relatively  less.  The overall  patterns  suggested  from these  data  obtained
from South Asia suggest an inverse relationship  between development  or
economic  base  and  reliance  upon  the  financial  support  from  higher  levels  of
government. Larger  cities  in India  rely  less  heavily  upon such  transfers;
poorer  localities  in Pakistan  are  supported  more heavily  by the  overlying
province; and rural  districts in Bangladesh are  provided a greuter
proportion  of their  total  revenues  than  are  their  urban  counterparts.
A similar  pattern  is  found  in  Malaysia. States  are  shown  to derive  28
percent of their revenues  from grants;  transfers  provided  36 percent  of
municipal  revenues  and  over  half  of rural  district  revenues.
Of all the country  data reviewed  in the table,  those  for Indonesia
show both the provinces  and regencies (districts)  and municipalities  to
rely most heavily  upon grants.  Grants  are provided  for both development
spending  and recurrent expenditures,  including all personnel spending.
Hence,  if reliance  upon  transfers  from  higher  levels  of government  is  used
as an indicator  of centralization,  Indonesia  must be concluded  to  be one  of
the  most  centralized  states  represented  here.
The  data  for  Korea  suggest  that  local  governments  in  that country  are
relatively  more self-reliant  than many of the other countries  represented
here.  The degree  of fiscal  independence  is,  however,  greatly  affected  by
the  fact  that  both  Seoul  and  Busan  are  reported  to  raise  over  90 percent  of
their  revenues  from  own-sources  compared  with  only  approximately  30  percent20
in other provinces and counties.10  Furthermore, the central government
retains  considerable  control  over  the activities  of local  governments,
11
including personnel appointments and monitoring of the budgetary process.
This is a good example of the potential misleading conclusions that can be
reached if simple proportions of total revenues derived locally are used as
the  sole  measure  of  the  amount  of  fiscal  autonomy  enjoyed by local
jurisdictions.
Data  from  both  Mexico  and  Ecuador  reveal  extremely  large  increases  in
the  reliance  of  local  governments  on  transfer  revenues.  The  proportion  of
total revenues derived from transfers to both states and municipalities in
Mexico increased from less than one-fifth to over three-fifths during the
ten years from the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s.  These changes resulted
from the 1980 Ldw  of Fiscal Coordination which provided additional shared
revenues in exchange for changes or even elimination of certain previously-
used  local  revenue  sources.  Since  the  shared revenues were tied to
relatively  elastic  revenue  sources,  they  provided  subnational  governments
with  a  more  buoyant  revenue  base.  The  growth  in shared  revenues  has,
however,  also  resulted  in  a  decline  in  the  fiscal  autonomy  of  local
10See Choong  Yong  Ahn, "Financing  Local and Regional Development:  The
Case of the Republic of Korea," Paper present to the Workshop on Financing
Local and Regional Development (Nagoya:  United Nations Centre for Regional
Development, 1984), p. 38.
1lDong Hoon Chun, Hyung-Hwan Kim and Kyu Sik Lee, "Fiscal Performance
of  Local  Governments  in  the  Seoul  Region:  Implications  for  Urban
Deconcentration  Policies,"  Discussion  Paper,  Report  No.  UDD-88,  Water
Supply  and  Urban  Development  Department,  Operations  Policy  Staff
(Washington,  DC:  The World Bank, 1985).21
jurisdictions  and  has  put  them  at  greater  finanoial  risk  to  finanoial
problems  at  the  central  government  level.
The  Ecuador  data  also  show  extremely  large  increases  In  the  reliance
upon  grants.  In  the  Ecuador  case,  however,  the  growth  occurred  primarily
during  the  1970s  with  the  proportions  leveling  off  since  then.  While  not
necessarily  tied  to  macro  economic  conditions,  it  Is  interesting  to  note
that  both  Mexico  and  Ecuador  benefited  from  the  petroleum  boom during  the
late  1970s.  The fiscal  condition  of  the  granting  government  is  certain  to
have  some  impact  on  its  willingness  to  transfer  revenues  to  subsidiary
jurisdictions.
Nigeria,  another  oil-producing  nation,  similarly  increased  the
reliance  of states  on  revenue  transfers  in  the  form  of  shared  taxes.  The
role  of  grants,  however,  declinad  during  the  late  1970s.  As  In  the  case  of
Mexico,  the  changes  observed  were  primarily  due  to  legislative  changes
introduced  during  the  latter  half  of  the  1970s.  As of  1975  revenue  sharlng
on  the  basis  of  derivation  of  tax  revenues  was diminished  in  importance;  in
return,  the  national  government  increased  contributions  to  the
Distributable  Pool  Account  (DPA).. 3 Subsequently,  a  new 1979  constitution
12See  The  World  Bank,  "Mexico:  Financing  State  and  Municipalities,
Trends,  Issues  and  Recommendations,"  Mexico  Programs  Division,  Urban
Projects  Division,  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  Regional  Office  (mimeo),
1987.
13Wilfred  A.  Ndongko,  "Revenue  Allocation  and  the  Stability  of the
Nigerian  Federation,"  Public  Administration  and  Finance  (April-June  1981),
pp.  151-164.22
gave  additional  taxing  powers  to the national  government  which  left the
state  governments  with  only  residual  tax  opportunities.  1
While the evidence  is not overwhelming,  this review  of country-level
data regarding  reliance  of subnational  governments  on intergovernmental
transfers  reveal  the following: no conclusion  can be reached  concerning
trends in the relative  importance  of grants in the revenue  structure  of
local governments;  in some countries  grant shares  have risen whereas in
others they have fallen;  5 grants  do not command  an extremely  important
role  in the  overall  spending  decisions  of  most  developing  countries,  public
expenditure  allocations  are still principally  determined  through  direct
expenditures;  and there appears  to be a concern  on the part of granting
governments  to  provide  greater  proportions  of  revenues  to  those  governments
which  may  be believed  to have  smaller  revenues  bases.
While  grant  allocations  measured  as a p.-oportion  of  total  revenues  may
suggest  that  granting  governments  favor  jurisdictions  that have
difficulties  mobilizing  resources  of their  own,  it does  not  follow  that  the
flow of funds to su.h jurisdictions  is necessarily  larger.  For example,
the primary general  revenue grant provided  to local governments  in the
Philippines,  the Bureau  of Internal  Revenue  Allotment,  constituted  24.2
1 Margaret  T. Okorodudu,  "Nigeria:  Analysis of Federal and State
Taxing Powers,"  International  Tax  Journal,  Vol. XI (Fall  1985),  pp. 305-
326.
15A similar lack of uniformity in trends concerning  the relative
fiscal roles of central and subnational governments  in industrialized
countries is documented by Roy Bahl, "The Design of Intergovernmental
Transfers  in Industrialized  Countries,"  Public  Budgeting  and  Finance,  Vol.
6,  No.  4 (Winter  1986),  p. 5.23
percent  of revenues  in Philippine  cities  (exclusive of  those  In
Metropolitan  Manila)  in  1977  and  35.2  percent  of revenues  in  a sample  of  98
municipalities.  But  since  total  revenues  were  considerably  greater  in the
cities,  the  per  capita  allocations  amounted  to an  average  of 13.45  pesos  to
oity  dwellers  and  only  6.24  pesos  to rural  residents.  This was  in  spite  of
the  fact that  per capita  personal  incomes  in citids  was  generally  greater
than in rural  areas.16  One implication  from this variety  of findings  is
that grant  systems  are  designed  with  several  objectives  in  mind.  It is to
that  topic  we now  turn.
Objectives  and  Types  of Grants
There is a variety  of criteria  against  which  grants  schemes  can be
evaluated.  There is also a variety  of different  grant  instruments  used.
Each is  considered  here.
Objectives
The criteria  of revenue  adequacy  and growth,  allocative  efficiency,
equity,  administrative  costs  and political  acceptability  are  commonly  used
to evaluate  tax  instruments.  7  Grants,  too,  can be evaluated  according  to
these  objectives,  although,  as is  noted  in  several  instances,  the  degree  to
which  these  objectives  are fulfilled  will depend  greatly  upon  whether  the
recipient  or granting  government  is conducting  the  evaluation.
16See Roy Bahl and Larry Schroeder, "Local  Government Structure,
Financial  Management  and Fiscal Conditions,"  in Local  Government  in the
Third  World:  A Case  Study  of the  Philippines,  ed. by Roy Bahl  and Barbara
D.  Miller  (New York:  Praeger  Publishers,  1983),  pp.  1-45.
1 7Davey,  Financing  Regional  Government.24
Revenue Adequacy and Growtht.  In  the  previous  section  data
regarding  the  relative  size  and  growth  rates  in revenues from grant
programs were shown.  Whether or not the allocations are, somehow, adequate
is, of course, nearly impossible to ascertain.  One approach would be to
allow recipient governments to put forward requests for funds and observe
if these  requests  are  granted; however,  the resulting  allocations  will
likely depend more on the ability of the local government to present its
argument and on its political clout at the granting government level than
on any real level  of need.  Another approach is determination of  needs
18
based upon objective criteria.  While such allocation mechanisms may be
based on a complex basis using a large set of criteria, data restrictions
in most developing countries generally limit the use of this approach.
It is, however, common to base allocations at least partially upon "need"
when  it  is approximated  by the  size of  the population  residing  in the
regional government or by one or two additional factors such as miles of
This approach to developing grant allocations is discussed in R.J.
Bennett,  Central  Grants  to  Local  Governments  (Cambridge:  Cambridge
University  Press,  1982),  Chapter  9;  Richard  Jackman,  "Estimating
Expenditure Need:  The Use of Regression Analysis in England and Wales," in
Measuring  Local  Government  Expenditure  Needs,  ed.  Cameron  and  Lotz,  pp.  21-
38  and  Joegen  Lotz,  "Social  Needs  Equalization:  The  Distribution  of
General  Grants  to  Local  Governments  in  Denmark,"  in  Measuring  Local
Government  Expenditure  Needs,  pp.  39-56.
19 0ne  attempt  at  designing  a  "needs"  based  allocation  mechanism  was
carried  out  by  West  Bengal  Municipal  Finance  Commission.  For a discussion
of  the  recommendations  of  that  Commission  see, Abhijit Datta, State-
Municipal Fiscal Relations:  A Comparative Study of Australia and India,
Research  Monograph  No.  37  (Canberra:  Centre  for  Research  on  Federal
Financial Relations, The Australian National University, 1982).25
road or area covered  by the local jurisdiction.  This still does not,
however,  insure  that  the  resulting  allocations  are  "adequate."
It is also desirable  for grant  allocations  to grow  over time  so  as to
permit local  spending to respond to increased  demands  due to larger
populations,  higher  prices  and increaseu  needs.  Closely  related  to the
growth criteria is the corollary that these increases in revenues  be
regular  and not  fluctuate  wildly  from year-to-year.  As most observers
of intergovernmental  relations have emphasized,  grant allocations  are
ultimately a  political decision.  While  all public  sector  fiscal
decisions,  e.g.,  changes  in local  tax  rates,  or user  fees,  are  political  in
nature, intergovernmental grants decisions are seemingly much less
controllable  at the local  level.  As such,  ad hoc changes  in allocation
mechanisms  may  occur  on what  seems  at  the  local  level  to be  a random  basis.
This has led Bird to argue that "fiscal transfers in many developing
countries  probably  constitute  one of the  least reliable  sources  of local
revenues."  2  Observations  documented  in the following  section tend to
confirm  this  statement.
20The  issue of  revenue instability in developing countries is
considered  in more detail  in William Duncombe  and Larry Schroeder,  "Tax
Instability in Developing Countries  and its Effect  on Budgeting  and
Financial  Management,"  International  Journal  of  Public  Administration  Vol.
11,  No.  3  (1988):  271-309.
21See, for example,  Richard  Bird, Intergovernmental  Fiscal  Relations
in Developing  Countries,  Staff  Working  Paper  No. 304 (Washington,  DC:  The
World  Bank,  1978); and  B.C. Smith, Decentralization:  The  Territorial
Dimension  of the  State (London: George  Allen  and Unwin  Publishers,  Ltd.,
1985).
22Bird,  Intergovernmental  Fiscal  Relations  in  Developing  Countries,  p.
75.26
Allocative  Efficiency.  One principle  economic  justification  for
intergovernmental  grants  is  to  help  overcome  "spillover"  effects  associated
with  governmental  services. Just  as the  normative  competitive  market  model
calls  for  governmental  intervention  to  produce  allocative  efficiency  in the
face of externalities,  the extension  of this model to the governmental
sphere requires intervention  in the determination  of local government
services that produce interjurisdictional  externalities.  For example,
intergovernmental  transfers  to localities  to treat effluents  that would
otherwise  be dumped  directly  into  a stream  and  negatively  affect  downstream
communities  is an example  of using  the grant  system  to overcome  spillover
effects. Similarly,  rural  development  grants  that  encourage  specific  types
of spending  which  are  expected  to increase  overall  productivity  and,  hence,
the  country's  economic  growth have  effects  beyond  the  localities
themselves.
This general  desire  for allocative  efficiency  rai3es  corollary  issues
concerning  the effects  of grants  on local  government  behavior. While  the
goal  of  altering  local  government  spending  to  overcome  spillover  effects  is
easily  stated,  ensuring  that it works  requires  further  investigation  into
the  reactions  of  localities  to such transfers. Several  responses  to  grant
programs  are  possible  and  are  likely  to  differ  depending  upon  the  structure
of  the  transfer  scheme.  An  increased  flow  of  grants  may  simply  result  in
an equal  decline in own source revenue effort on the part of local
jurisdictions  without  any  reallocative  efficiency  achieved. The nature  of
the  grant  programs  may  be  such  that,  to  the  extent  that  local
taxpayer/citizens  see  the  transfers  essentially  as  "costless",  there  will27
be  little  pressure  on  local  officials  to spend  the funds  efficiently.
While  mandates,  rules  and audits  may  be  used to  avoid  these  potential
undesirable effects of grants, few developing countries have the resources
to insure local government accountability.  Finally, the hoped-for effect
of grants to achieve allocative efficiency also alters budgetary choices
that otherwise would have been made locally.  Where revenues are fungible,
such outcomes are not guaranteed.  On the other hand, it may be the case
that the spillover effects of aided functions are not significant; altering
budget choices away from  their locally optimal  allocations can, in such
instances, result in a welfare loss to the locality that is greater than
the increase in welfare enjoyed by the rest of the nation.
Distributional Equity.  Perhaps the most commonly stated rationale
for  intergovernmental grants in low income countries is to achieve some
sort of redistribution.  Economically depressed localities are often seen
as  being  unable  to  raise  revenues  sufficient  to  meet  the  many  spending
demands  placed  upon  them  (ironically,  demands  often  mandated  by  the  higher
level  of  government).  In  such  instances  some  form  of  "equalizing"  grant  is
in  order.
A  question  that  immediately  arises  concerns  what  is  to  be  "equalized."
One view would be that the capacity of  local  governments  to  finance  some
level of services ought to be similar across jurisdictions.  A second view
is  that spending "needs"  should be the focus  of the grant distribution
objective  with  those  communities  experiencing  greater  need, somehow
defined, receiving larger allocations of funds.  The first of these views
concentrates  on revenue mobilization ability; the second emphasizes service28
provision.  rhese  two  views  may  result  in  rather  different  sectoral
allocations  of  grant  monies--specifically  differential  treatment  of rural
and urban communities.  Revenues  may more easily be mobilized in urban
areas due to the availability  of more convenient  tax "hanales", e.g.,
business  transactions  and  a more  monetized  economy. The  capacity  criterion
might  then  lead  to greater  allocations  of  grants  to  rural  communities  which
are  less  capable  of  raising  their  own  revenues. Urbanization,  on the  other
hand,  may be argued  to produce  major public  sector  spending  needs,  e.g.,
for  water,  sewer,  drainage,  and  transportation  services,  not  as pressing  in
rural areas.  Under the needs criterion greater allocations  would be
diverted  to urban  areas.
In spite of the often-stated  concern  for redistributional  equity,
neither  approach is commonly  implemented in any systematic way  in
developing  countries  due  to the  paucity  of data  available  to  measure  either
fiscal  capacity  or the  even  more elusive  measures  of "need". While  income
may  be the  most  general  indicator  of  a  local  government's  capacity  to  raise
revenues,  seldom  are such data available  on a reasonably  current  basis.
Similarly,  only the  relatively  crude  indicators  of "need"  mentioned  above
in the discussion  of revenue  adequacy,  e.g.,  population,  miles of road  or
area,  are  commonly  available  in developing  countries. To supplement  these
measures, even more  subjective  indicators  of  "backwardness"  or  "special
circumstances"  are  sometimes  used (or  purportedly  are  used)  to achieve  the
equity  objective.
Two additional  factors  regarding  redistributional  equity  should  also
be  recognized.  Whereas  the  equity  goal  commonly  sought  In29
intergovernmental  grant programs  suggests  that, if attained,  low income
persons  will be benefited,  that result  is not necessary  even if a well-
defined  and workable  allocation  mect.anism  is devised.  Local government
services may be highly biased towards the wealthier,  politically  more
powerful  segments  of the population. Hence,  expecting  grants  to achieve
broad-based  income  redistributional  goals is not realistic. Furthermore,
redistribution  implies  some knowledge  of the  sources  of funds  used in the
grant schemes.  Seldom,  if ever,  are such broad  incidence  considerations
factored  into  the  pursuit  of equity
Administrative  Ease.  Just as all taxes cannot be effectively
administered  at low cost,  alternative  kinds  of grants  require  differential
amounts  of administrative  oversight  and compliance  costs.  Administrative
complexity,  and therefore  administrative  costs,  are likely  to be greater
when the  grant  programs  are  designed  to achieve  other  kinds  of goals  or to
avoid  particular  undesirable  effects. For  example,  a lump  sum transfer  of
money  without  any strings  attached  to its use (other  than,  perhaps,  normal
auditing  to  insure  avoidance  of  fraud  4nd  abuse)  requires few
administrative  inputs on either the part of the granting  or recipient
governments.  Such schemes, however, are much less likely to achieve
particular reallocation objectives  than are the  more expensive to
administer  grants  that  are  mandated  to  be  spent  for  particular  purposes;
even  greater  are  the  administrative  costs  of  capital  spending  grants  that
are  allocated  only  after  the  project  has  been  approved  by  the  granting
agency  in an attempt  to insure  effective  use  of the  funds.  Similarly,  a
flat equal  allocation  of money to all jurisdictions,  as was used for at30
least  two years  in the  rural  development  grant  program  in  Bangladesh,
requires much less administrative input than do formula grants involving
several  needs or  capacity indicators; these  administrative savings were
achieved, however, only at the cost of distributional  equity.
Political  Feasibility.  Intergovernmental  grant  programs are,
ultimately,  always  political  instruments.  They  are also perhaps more
politically  sensitive  than  any  other  budgetary  decision made at  the
granting jurisdiction level since they are seen to most  directly affect
local  taxpayer/service  beneficiaries.  While  spatial  and  sectoral
allocations  of  central  ministry  budgets  can  greatly  affect  individual
service  levels,  they  can  be  mu^h  more  easily  "hidden"  in  the  detail  of  a
complex central government budget.  This is not the case for allocations to
individual  jurisdictions.  They  are  explicit;  furthermore,  in  a
decentralized governmental environment, individuals may feel they can have
a greater say in the use of these funds.  hence, an attempt to restructure
the  transfer system  is very likely to  face strong  political  opposition
unless many jurisdictions can be shown to gain or at least not to lose from
the  reform.  In  fact,  developed  countries  face  similar  political
constraints--witness  the  common  use  of  "hold-harmless"  provisions
(provisions insuring that no jurisdiction will lose  revenues) in state-
level grant programs In the United States.
Because of  the sensitive political nature of grant programs, seldom
are the systems designed exactly as an apolitical analyst might.  Instead,
the "systems" tend to be built up over the years in response to particular
political pressures so that commonly they do not resemble systems at all31
but,  instead,  become  a  hodge-podge  of  transfer  schemes  with  no  apparent  set
of explicit goals.23  Furthermore,  in some countries,  e.g., Nepal and
Pakistan,  national  level politicians,  e.g., members of parliament,  are
provided with "grants" which can be used for pet projects  within  the
districts they represent.  Even though these projects may not differ
substantially  from  projects  undertaken  by  local  governments,  there  is  often
no  attempt  to  coordinate  projects  undertaken  with  these  funds  with  ordinary
local  government  projects  nor  is  there  any  concern  for  longer  term
maintenance  needs  associated  with  these  schemes.
Other  Goals.  Sometimes  grant  programs  have  explicit  goals  other
than  those  noted  above.  For  example,  grants  to  certain  rural  local
governments  in  the  Punjab  Province  of  Pakistan  are  justified  on  the  grounds
that  by  improving  the infrastructure  of these areas,  there  will be  less
rural-to-urban  migration.  Although  this rationale  may lie behind  other
grant  schemes  biased  in  favor  of  rural  areas,  the  Pakistan  case  is  one
instance  where  this  goal  has  been  made  explicit.  Since  it has  been  in
effect  for  only  a short  period  of time,  it is too  early  to tell  whether  it
has been effective;  nevertheless,  unless  these  grants  are accompanied  by
significant  increases in employment  opportunities,  such infrastructure
development  is  unlikely  to be  effective  at  stemming  urban  migration.
23The  non-systematic  nature  of  grant  programs  in  mary  developing
countries is emphasized  in Bird, Intergovernmental  Fiscal  Relations  in
Developing  Countries.
24Larry  Schroeder,  Rural  Development  Grants  to  Local  Governments  in
Asia,  Metropolitan  Studies  Program  Monograph  No.  19,  Local  Revenue
Administration Project, The Maxwell School  (Syracuse,  NY:  Syracuse
University,  March  1987).32
Rural  employment  is  also commonly  stated  as  a  3oal of rural
development  grant programs,  e.g. in both Bangladesh  and Indonesia.  The
employment  goal  provides  a  bias  in  favor  of  infrastructure  projects  that
are  labor  intensive  and,  therefore,  may result  in a set  of  projeots  that  do
not  yield  the  most efficient  use  of funds  when  viewed  locally. It  is also
questionable  whether  such  activities  are  effective  at redistributing  income
to low income  unemployed  persons  or have  a significant  effect  on national
unemployment.
A final  issue  that  sometimes  is raised  with  regards  to grant  financing
is  its  effect  on  efforts  to  decentralize  decision-making  power.  While  this
goal  is  generally  associated  with  the  allocative  efficiency  criterion
mentioned  previously,  it deserves  special  attention  due to the emphasis
which decentralization  is often given in developing  countries  and the
potential  conflicts between central government  financing of local
government  activity  and decentralization.  The issue  centers  on the degree
of local  autonomy  that is possible  when a significant  portion  of  funds  are
being provided  from higher  levels  of government. While certain  types  of
grants (discussed  below)  provide  greater  local autonomy  than do others,
fiscal  responsibility  by granting  governments  requires  that  some  concern  be
given to how grant proceeds  are spent by recipient  jurisdictions. The
issue then is one of finding a balance between maintenance  of fiscal
responsibility  over the use of central  government  revenues  and allowing
recipient  governments  to use  the  revenues  so as to maximize  local  economic
welfare.  Unfortunately,  there  is neither  a single  nor simple  solution  to
this  issue.33
Types  of  Grants
At least  three  interrelated  decisions  are  required  when a government
decides  to transfer  funds  to lower-level  jurisdictions.  One  addresses  how
the  overall  size  of the  amounts  to be distributed  are to be determined.  A
second  concerns  how  the  amounts  are  to  be  allocated  among  the  several
eligible  recipient  governments.  The  third  regards  the  choice  of  transfer
instrument  which,  in  turn,  affects  the  amount  of  autonomy  the  recipient
government  has in determining  how the funds can be spent.  The first of
these issues concerns the "vertical"  fiscal balance between  levels of
government;  the second  has to do with "horizontal"  balance;  the third
directly  affects  the  degree  of direct  fiscal  control  exerted  by the  higher
level  jurisdiction.  Answers to each of  these questions will have
considerable  influence  on  the  achievement  of  the  several,  often
conflicting,  goals  noted  above.
Several  different  methods  to determine  the  size  of the  grant  pool  are
possible. One is to tie the  amount  to be allocated  to one  or  more  sources
of revenue  collected  by the granting  Jurisdiction. Such  an approach  can
result  in a growing  resource  pool but,  if followed,  is likely  to decrease
the fiscal  flexibility  of the  granting  jurisdiction.  For  this  reason,  many
granting  governments  prefer  to allocate  funds  on an ad hoc basis  as a part
of the annual  budget  process  or as specified  under a multi-year  central
plan.  A third  determination  of the  grant  pool  would  be to base it on the
amount  of  spending  planned  and  undertaken  by  the  recipient  government  but
approved  by the  granting  jurisdiction.34
Allocation  among  recipient  governments  can  also either  be carried  out
in a systematic,  well-defined  basis  or be conducted  in an ad hoc manner.
One technique,  applicable  when grant pools are tied to specific  revenue
sources,  is to  allocate  the  amounts  on the  basis  of where  the  revenues  were
derived.  This is the case when tax sharing arrangements  are used to
transfer  funds to lower level governments. Other systematic  allocation
methods can be based  on formulas  which either  reflect  general  needs  and
resources  of the recipient  jurisdictions  or which are used to reimburse
localities  for  a portion  or  all  of the  expenditures  undertaken  for specific
activities.
Finally,  the degree  of autonomy  permitted in spending  grants will
likely be of considerable  interest to both the granting  and recipient
jurisdictions. General-purpose,  lump-sum  allocations,  often  termed  block
grants,  can  provide  the  local  jurisdictions  with  considerable  latitude  in
spending  the  transferred  money.  Categorical  grants,  on  the  other  hand,  are
restricted  to  particular  uses  sometimes  with  prior  approval  of  the
expenditures  necessary  before  the  transfer  takes  place. Such  grants  permit
the granting  government  much  more  power in determining  the sectoral
allocation  of funds.  While categorical  grants  may stipulate  the use to
which  they  can  be  put,  they  can  also  be  designed  to  cover  only  some  portion
of  the  total  amount  spent  locally.  Such  matching  arrangements  can  be  used
to insure  that the  locality  puts  forth  some  effort  on its  own  to undertake
the spending  activity. Finally,  such  matching  or cost-sharing  grants  can
be open-  or closed-ended. The  former  permits  the  recipient  government  to
spend  whatever  amount  it wishes  on the  supported  activity,  whereas  under  a35
closed-ended  matching  arrangement,  only  local  spending  up  to  some  maximum
amount  will  be  matched  through  transfer.
The  matrix  shown  in Table  4  provides  a convenient  way  to  differentiate
among  the types  of transfer  policy  choices  and  evaluate  the  outcomes  of a
grant  system.  5  The  columns  of  the  table  represent  the  three  principal
ways  in  which  the  grant  pool  is  determined;  the  rows  indicate  the  four
primary  allocation  techniques. Not all of the 12 cells in the table  are
filled  since  certain  combinations  of these  policy  choices  are  not  feasible;
however,  within  the feasible  cells  the  most likely  type  of grant  scheme--
general  purpose  versus  categorical--are  noted  where  one form is the more
likely  (though  not  absolutely  necessary).
Type A  grants are simply shared taxes with the higher  level of
government  collecting  and  transferring  some  proportion  of locally  collected
revenues  to the local  government.  While  the IMF Government  Finance
Statistics  do not term shared  taxes as grants,  when the higher  level  of
gov4rnment  unilaterally  sets the  tax  rates,  defines  the  tax  base,  collects
the  tax  and  simply  distribu;es  the  proceeds  thereof  to  the  local  government
In which the taxes  were collected,  the results  are  no different  than  if a
grant program  was established  in which  the same  revenues  were distributed
on a formula  basis  to local  governments  with  the  only  factor  in the  formula
being the location  of the collection  of the tax.  Obviously,  there are
instances where  somewhat greater discretion is allowed  to the local
5The  matrix  is derived  from that  developed  by Roy Bahl and  Johannes
Linn,  Urban  Public  Finance  and  Administration  in  Less  Developed  Countries
(Washington,  DC:  The  World  Bank,  forthcoming).36
TABLE  4
ALTERNATIVE  FORMS  OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL
GRANT  PROGRAMS
Method  of Determining  the  Total  Divisible  Pool
Method  of Allocating  Specified  Share  Reimbursement
the  Divisible  Pool  of  a Granting  Ad  Hoc  of Approved
among  Eligible  Units  Government  Tax  Decision  Expenditure
Origin  of  Tax  Collection  A  --  --
(general-purpose)
Formula  B  F  --
(??)  (??)
Cost  Reimbursement  C  G  K
(categorical)  (ca*egorical)  (categorical)
Ad Hoc  Decision  D  H  --
(??)  (??)
SOURCE: Adapted  from  Roy Bahl  and  Johannes  Linn,  Urban  Public  Finance  and
Admin4stration  in  Less  Developed  Countries  (Washington,  DC:  The  World
Bank,  forthcoming).37
government  in  the  colleotion  of such  taxes. For  example,  localities  may  be
given  the option  of "piggy-backing"  a local  tax onto a tax  already  being
collected  by the higher  level  of government. Sinoe  the locality  has the
option  here,  the  tax  is  more  akin  to  a looal  levy  than  to a gSant.
Formula-based  allocations  (Types B  and  F) force  the  granting
government  to decide  on the factors  which  are to be used in determining
grant  shares. These  factors  may  be indicators  of need,  e.g.,  population  or
miles  of road,  or may attempt  to account  for loo1l  revenue  capacity,  e.g.,
some  measure  of local  income  or taxable  economic  aotivity. The  grants  may
be general-purpose  in nature with the proceeds available to be spent
however  the  locality  sees  fit,  as in the  case  of formula  block  allocations
made in the Philippines,  cr their uses may be limited  as is the  case in
Bangladesh  where  recipients  of the  upazila  (sub-district)  development  grant
must  allocate  prespecified  portions  of the  transfer  to different  sectors.
Cost reimbursement  allocation  schemes (Types  C, G and K) are most
commonly  categorical  in nature  with the  recipient  government  restrieted  in
its use of the funds.  While matching grants  may be used, it is also
possible  for  the  granting  government  to cover  all  of the  spending. This  is
particularly  the case  for  salary  grants  such  as used  in Indonesia. If  the
size  of the  cost reimbursable  grant  pool (Types  C and  G) is predetermined,
any  matching  funds  will  likely  be closed-ended;  type  K grants,  however,  can
be open-ended  although the fiscal difficulties  that face most central
governments  in developing  nations  make  such  arrangements  unlikely.
When ad hoc  decisions  are  made concerning  the  allocation  of funds,  it
is difficult  to generalize  regarding  the type of grant  mechanism  that is38
used.  Nevertheless, given the political nature of transfer programs and
the  desire to maintain political control, these mechanisms, particularly
Type  H  grants,  are  likely  to  be  the  choice  of  most  higher  level
governments.
When evaluated against the criteria discussed above, ea-h of the grant
instruments has  different strengths and weaknesses;  furthermore, what is
seen  as  an  advantage  to  the  granting  goverriment  may  be considered a
disadvantage  by the  recipient  government.  Revenue adequacy  and  growth
will,  of  course,  depend  upon  the  manner  in which  the grant pool  is
determined.  Grant pools tied explicitly to an elastic revenue source are
much  more  likely  to  result  in  revenue  growth  and  revenue  certainty  than  are
grants  determined  annually  on  an  ad  hoc  basis.  Therefore,  grant  types  A,
B, C  and  D may  be  preferred  over  the  other  type  grants  by  recipient
governments; however, since  such explicit tying of revenue usage reduces
the budgetary control of  the granting  government, determining  the grant
pool  through  ad  hoc  techniques  may  be preferred by higher levels of
government.
The allocative  efficiency of grant  instruments has  been considered
extensively by economists using traditional economic theory.  One concern
in  such  analyses  is  the extent  to which  block and  categorical  grants
differentially affect budgetary allocations.  If the objective of a grant
is to increase a particular type of spending, e.g., expenditures that have
positive spillover effects, categorical  grants for such activities would be
preferred  to  general  block  grant  allocations.  General  purpose  governments
may,  however,  react  to  such  categorical  grants  by  decreasing  the amounts39
they  would  have  otherwise  spent  on the  activity. These  decreases  can  occur
either through a  budgetary reallocation by recipient governments  to
increase  other types of spending  or through  a diminished  level of own-
source  revenue  effort.
The  own-source revenue response by recipient governments  is of
particular  interest  to analysts  and  granting  governments. If  an objective
of a grant  program  in a developing  country  is to increase  local  government
spending,  this objective  can not be achieved  if the  recipient  government
simply  diminishes  its  own  taxing  effort.
The issue  has  been  most extensively  considered  in developed  countries
using  traditional  economic  analysis.  The common  formal  approach  to these
analyses  relies on the assumption  that local communities  have a well-
defined  preference  function  for government  (G)  and private  goods (X) as
exhibited  in the indifference  curve  shown  in Figure  1.  At equilibrium  E,
the community  consumes  OX private  goods and OG government  goods.  These
public expenditures  are financed  through local tax and nontax revenues
amounting  to XX',  or  a tax  rate  of XX'/OX.
See,  for example,  Edward  M. Gramlich,  "State  and Local  Governments
and  Their  Budget  Constraint,"  International  Economic  Review,  Vol. 10 (June
1969),  pp.  168-182;  Edward  M. Gramlich  and  Harvey  Galper,  "State  and  Local
Fiscal Behavior  and Federal Grant Policy, Brookings  Papers  on Economic
Activity,  Vol. 1 (1973),  pp.  15-54;  James Henderson, "Local  Government
Expenditures:  A Social Welfare Analysis,"  The  Review  of  Economics  and
Statistics,  Vol. 50  (May 1968),  pp.  156-163;  Enid Slack,  "Local Fiscal
Response  to Intergovernmental Transfers," The  Review  of Economics  and
Statistics,  Vol. 62 (1980),  pp.  364-370;  David  L. Smith,  "The  Response  of
State  and Local  Governments  to  Federal  Grants,"  National  Tax  Journal,  Vol.
21 (September  1968).40
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A lump-sum  grant  is equivalent  to an increase  in income  available  to
the locality  and, in the  context  of the graphical  analysis,  results  in a
parallel  shift  in the budget  constraint  to the  right  by the  amount  of the
grant,  G'G" (Figure  2).  Conceptually,  there is no limitation  regarding
where the new equilibrium  might occur.  Point  F in Figure  2 suggests  an
increase  in public  spending-  but by less than the amount  of the grant;
point  H shows  public  expenditures  increasing  by exactly  the  same  amount  of
the grant;  at point  I the locality  has cut back its  own spending  so as to
result  in only an  increase in private sector spending.  It is also
conceivable  that  the  transfer  results  in an increase  in public  expenditures
by an amount  greater  than  the  initial  grant  (point  J) or even  a decrease  in
spending  (point  K).
Local revenue or tax effort will change depending  upon the income
elasticity  of demand for public  spending.  A unitary  income elasticity
means that  the  percentage  increase  in public  expenditures  is exactly  equal
to the  percentage  increase  in income  and  will result  in no change  in the
ratio  of taxes  to total  income.  For  example,  if at point  F the  ratio  of
public  spending  to total  income  is equal  to that at point  E, the tax  rate
X 2"/OX"  is unchanged  from XX'/OX'.  If the income  slasticity  for public
spending  is greater  than one, the proportion  of expenditures  to income
available  will increase  and will require  an increase  in local taxes;  in
such an instance,  the grant  can  be said  to be stimulative  of local  revenue
effort. If  the  income  elasticity  is  less  than  one,  the  grant  is  said  to be
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While  there  is  some  evidence  that  lump-sum  grants  to  local  governments
in  developed  countries  stimulate  local  tax  effort,  in  many  developing
nations  there  are  likely  to be constraints  to such  a response  even  if the
demand  for public  expenditures  is income  elastic. If  local  revenue  effort
is limited due to statutory tax rate and tax base restrictions  or by
administrative  problems or if the ability of the local government  to
deliver  services  is somehow  limited,  local  governments  are  likely  to lower
their own-source  revenue effort.  One possible  approach  to stimulating
local  tax  effort  in  the  case  of  formula-based  lump  sum  grants  is  to include
in that formula some measure of revenue effort.  There are, however,
difficulties  in implementing  such formulae  in developing  countries  due to
the  lack  of  data  necessary  to  measure  this  effort.
Categorical,  cost-reimbursement  grants  have  the  effect  of lowering  the
"price"  of  local  public  expenditures.  Figure  3  shows  this  as a rotation  of
the budget  constraint  with the extent  of the  rotation  depending  upon the
percent  of the  cost  reimbursed  and  the importance  of the  aided  function  in
the  local  budget. Again,  there  is no a priori  limitation  concerning  where
a new locally-desired  equilibrium  might occur.  If one assumes  that the
granting  government  uses  a categorical  grant  with  the expectation  that  the
proceeds  will yield  an equal  increase  in local  spending,  point  H would  be
deemed most  desirable from  the standpoint  of the  higher level  of
government. To insure  this outcome  the granting  government  may attempt  to
require  some "maintenance  of tax effort"  in the grant  design,  i.e.,  that
the ratio of local revenue  to total income  must remain  at XX'/OX'.  If44
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local  community  preferences  are  such  that  point  F  is  actually  most  desired,
the  result  is  a  decrease  in  community  welfare.
Since partial  cost reimbursement  grants have  both  income  and
substitution  effects  whereas  lump sum grants  involve  only income  effects,
the  former  are  expected  to be less  likely  to lead to  lowered  local  revenue
efforts.  Yet, such categorical  grants  are more likely  to interfere  with
local  preferences  and  result  in  a  lower  level  of  welfare  than  equal  sized
block  grants.
The distributive  implications  of formula-based  transfers  will depend
primarily  upon the factors  used in the formula;  however,  unlike ad hoc
allocations,  they  do  require  that  the  granting  government  make  explicit  its
redistributive  preferences. Tax sharing  arrangements  are likely  to favor
more economically  advanced  localities  and will fail to achieve  equalizing
objectives.  Cost reimbursement  grants,  particularly  if they require a
relatively  high local  match,  can also  result  in greater  flows  of funds  to
wealthier  localities  which  have the ability  to raise the necessary  local
revenues.  Similarly,  if categorical  transfers  are made only  to
jurisdictions  which su¢es;sfully  apply for such funds, localities  with
better  planning  capabilities  are  likely  to be favored  in the  allocation  of
funds.  Hence,  traditional  redistributional  objectives  of grants  are  most
likely  to be served  via formula  grants  that include  explicit  measures  of
economic  backwardness in the formula or  by ad hoc  allocation that
implicitly  favor  less  developed  areas.
In terms  of administrative  costs,  shared  taxes  may be most desirable
since  the higher  level  of government  that collects  the  tax  may be able  to46
do so more  economically than can a large number of lower  levels of
government. Categorical  grants,  on the  other  hand,  are  likely  to be more
costly  to administer than are block, lump-sum allocations. Complex
applications  may be required  for  specific-use  grants  with  a time-consuming
approval  process  also  necessary;  furthermore,  there  is likely  to be a  more
detailed  auditing procedure  established  to insure that the categorical
grants  were  used  as designed.
In sum, cost reimbursable  categorical  grants  have the advantages  of
allowing  the higher  level  of government  to force  recipient  governments  to
allocate  resources  in  the  manner  they  see  most desirable  with  less  lowering
of local  revenue  effort;  however,  they are more likely  to result  in local
welfare  losses  and  require  greater  administrative  oversight  and compliance
costs.  Formula-based  lump sum  grants  can be designed  to achieve
redistributional  objectives  through  inclusion  of measures  of need  or local
revenue  base.  Finally,  from the standpoint  of political  acceptability,
grant schemes  which give greater  control  to the granting  government  are
likely  to be preferred  at the  higher  level  and  least  desirable  when  viewed
from  below.
Current  Practices  and  Results  of  Grant  Systems
As has been  emphasized above, intergovernmental grants  are  the
products  of  political  decisions.  With  numerous  grant  instruments  available
and  objectives  which  may  change  as the  political  environment  is  altered,  it
is not particularly  surprising  to find that grant allocation practices
often  differ  greatly  from the  existing  statutes. In this  section  we first47
review  cases  where  the transfer  schemes  cliffer  from those  dictated  in the
statutes. We then turn to examples  of how  grant  programs  create  outcomes
that differ  substantially  from the objectives  commonly  sought  from such
schemes.  Finally,  we review  some analyses  of the empirical  effects  of
grant  programs.
Practices  Vis-a-Vis  Statutes
When  evaluating a grant system, the following  scenario  is quite
common.
Step  1: Granting government officials suggest that the
existing  grant program  is implemented  exactly  as stated  in
the  statutes  and  rules.
Step  2: Discussions with recipient government officials
indicate that, in fact,  there are certain  discrepancies
between  the  statutes  and  practice.
Step  3:  Subsequent  discussions at  the higher  level  of
gbvernment  leads  to admission  that  it is not  always  possible
to conduct  the grant  scheme  as suggested  in the underlying
legislation.
Step  4: Analysis  of data obtained  at the central  government
level  indicates that, in fact, revenues  are not  being
allocated  in  the  manner  shown  in  the  laws.
Step  5: Further  analysis  at the local level may show even
further  discrepancies  between actual  practice  and what had
been  statutorily  mandated.
There  can  be numerous  reasons  (some  good)  for  such discrepancies.  In
part,  the political  nature of  grants within  a  changing  political
environment can  produce such behavior on the  part of the granting
government. Anticipation  of elections  may yield  grant  flows that differ
greatly  from what the  statutes  imply;  likewise,  severe  economic  or fiscal
problems faced  by the  granting governiment  may result in extra-legal48
cutbacks  in  grant  flows.  The  discrepanc.  are  sometimes  traceable  to  a
lack  of  understanding  by  recipient  governmt.,t  officials  of  the  practices
that  are  supposed  to  oocur  at  the  higher  level  of  government.  Officials  in
some  localities  do  not  know how  their  allocations  are  determined;  they
simply  know that  some  amount  is  likely  to  be  transferred  without  any  idea
of  how that  amount was set.  In  such  instances,  the  granting  government  has
little  incentive  to  shed  light  on  the  process  since  ipi,  rance  of  the
procedures  (on  the  part  of  the  local  government)  puts  it  in  an  even  more
powerful  position  to  alter  allocations  purely  on  an  ad  hoc  basis.
In what  follows  several  examples  are  given  where  statutory  grant
programs  have  been  altered  in  a  manner  to  subvert  the  original  intent  of
the  legislation.  The  conflicting  objectives  that  helped  lead  to  these
results  are  also  noted,  wherever  possible.
Grant  Revenue Shortfalls.  When granting  governments  face  pressing
financial  difficulties,  transfers  to  lower  level  governments  are  likely  to
be  among the  expenditure  items  cut  back  to  reduce  deficits  regardless  of
the  statutory  basis  of  the  grant  programs.  One  good  example  of  such  a
phenomenon is  the  Philippines  where  the  revenue  pool  of  one  of  the  primary
intergovernmental  grant  programs,  the  Bureau  of  Internal  Revenue  (BIR)
Allotment,  is to  equal  20  percent  of  total  BIR  collections  two  years
previous  to  the  distribution.  Since  the  mid-1970s,  however,  this  statutory
basis  of  the  BIR has  not  been  distributed.  Table  5  shows  the  proportions
of  the  statutory  amounts  that  were  actually  distributed  during  the  period49
TABLE  5
ACTUAL  DISTRIBUTION  OF PHILIPPINE  BIR  GRANTS
TO LOCAL  GOVERNMENTS,  1975  TO 1980
Bureau  of Internal  Revenue  Allotment
Percentage
Actual  As Percent  of  Increase/
Year  Distribution  Amount  Due  Decrease
1975  505.4  84.26  ---
1976  547.8  62.38  8.39
1976a  315.1  74.56  -42.48
1977  658.9  57.77  109.11
1978  658.9  58.97  0.00
1979  658.9  49.44  0.00
1980  658.9  35.56  0.00
aSix  month  transition.
SOURCE: Accounting  Divisions,  BIR,  MOF  and  NEDA.50
1975-1980.27  While such shortfalls can be justified on the basis of
macroeconomic  problems,  they  do have the  effect  of negating  the advantages
that  tying a grant  pool to specific revenue sources have on local
government  fiscal  planning  and  grant  revenue  growth.
Subverting  Distributional  Formulae.  A  l  l  o  c  a  t  i  o  n  s  0  f
intergovernmental transfers  among recipient  governments are  often
supposedly  based upon a well-defined  formula.  Such objective  factors  as
population,  land area,  miles of road,  etc. are commonly  stated  to be the
sole determinants  of grant distributions. It is, however,  also the case
that when an analyst  attempts  to replicate  the allocations  to Individual
jurisdictions  based  upon the purportedly-used  formula,  such a replication
is not  possible. This suggests  that  other,  more subjective  factors,  have
been used  to supplement  the  formula-based  allocations. Such discrepancies
have, for  example, been observed  in the  Philippines,  Nepal  9 and
Pakistan.30 Most commonly  the grant agency  admits that "other  factors"
have been used to adjust the formula-based  allocations  with pclitical
considerations  probably  one of  these  variables.
7Roy  Bahl and  Larry  Schroeder,  "Intergovernmental  Fiscal  Relations,"
i  n  Local  Government  Finance  in the  Third  World: A Case  Study  of the
Philippines,  ed. by Roy Bahl and Barbara  D. Miller (New  York:  Praeger
Publishers,  1983),  pp.  119-122.
28Bahl  and  Schroeder,  "Intergovernmental  Fiscal  Relations."
29Larry Schroeder  and  James  Wozny,  "Financing  Rural  Local Panchayats
in  Nepal," Metropolitan Studies Program Occasional  Paper No. 108, The
Maxwell  School  (Syracuse,  NY:  Syracuse  University,  July  1987).
3 0Schroeder,  Rural  Development  Grants  to  Local  Governments  in  Asia.51
Decentralization.  Policy statements in developing  nations  often
advocate  decentralized  decision-making  and, sometimes,  the statutes  are
even altered  to roster  decentralization.  Some  countries  have accompanied
decentralization  policy  initiatives  with expanded  use of grant flows in
spite of the obvious conflicts which such financing can create.  For
example,  when  the  Government  of Bangladesh  upgraded  the thana  level  of
government  as  the  focal  point  of  its  decentralization  program  in  1983,
grants  to  rural  governments  were  increased  from  Tk  1.82  per  capita  to  Tk
10.12.31  While  block  grants  were  used  to  carry  out  this  transfer  of
resources,  considerable  power  was  maintained  by  the  central  government.
Furthermore,  the  large  absolute  sizes  of  these  block  grants  provided  little
incentivt  for  the  local  governments  to mobilize  resources  using  even the
few  local  revenue  instruments  provided  to  them.  While  the  large  flow  of
funds  was  likely  used  to  strengthen  the  political  backing of  the
decentralization  policy,  observers  are  skeptical  that  the  policy  has truly
resulted  in  a transfer  of power  to  the  local  bodies. 32
Another  example  of practices  which  differs  from the  underlying  policy
of  decentralized  autonomy  provided  to  subnational  governments  has  been
observed  in  Nigeria.  As  stated  by  Ndongko,  "The  allocation  of  revenues  by
the  federal  to the  state  governments  since  the  1960s  has  taken  place  on the
basis of two fundamental  principles--the  principle  of derivation  and the
31See  Schroeder,  Rural  Development  Grants  to  Local  Governments  in
Asia,  p.28.
32See Ahmed  Shafiqul  Huque,  "The Illusion  of Decentralization:  Local
Administration  in  Bangladesh,"  International  Review  of  Administrative
Sciences,  Vol.  52,  No.  1  (1986),  pp.  79-95.52
principle of need." 3 3 Obviously, these two criteria  are likely  to
conflict  with wealthier  regions obtaining  relatively  larger grants  when
derivation  of national  government  revenues  is used the principle  of grant
allocation.  This apparently led  the Nigerian federal  government  to
institute  additional  specific  grants  to the less wealthy  states  to allow
them  to undertake  projects  they  could  otherwise  not  afford  in spite  of the
fact that  such  categorical  grants  greatly  eroded  the  financial  autonomy  of
the  recipient  states. 34  Smith  reaches  a similar  conclusion  in his  review
of the  reorganizational  reforms  completed  in 1976  and notes  that  the  large
dependency  of local  governments  on financial  resources  from  a higher  level
of government in Nigeria  is partially explained by the fact that,
"  ... throughout  its history  local government  has been  organized  by central
authorities  which,  despite  the rhetoric  of democratic  decentralizations,
have been  more  concerned  to strengthen  control  than  local  autonomy." 35
Political  Eh.tors.  The highly-charged  political  environment  in
which grant allocations  are made can have considerable  effects on the
conduct  of a statute-based  grant  system. Unless  the  grant  pool  is  somehow
increased,  changes  in  the  determinants  of  allocations  will  result  in
revenue  "losses"  for  some  Jurisdictions  if  other  recipient  governments  gain
33Ndongko, "Revenue  Allocation  and  the  Stability  of  the  Nigerian
Federation  1960-1980,"  p. 160.
34Ibid,  p. 161.
35B.C. Smith,  "The  Revenue  Position  of Local  Government  in Nigeria,"
Public  Administration  and  Development  (January-March  1982),  p. 12.53
from the  change. Obviously,  such changes  will  face considerable  political
opposition  from  the  losing  governments.
In Pakistan, the 1973 constitution calls for a National  Finance
Commission  to meet every five years to reconsider  how provinces  are to
share  federal  government  tax revenues. The current  sharing  allocation  is
based upon recommendations  made by the Commission in  1974.  Although
another  Commission  was appointed  in 1979,  its recommendations  were never
made public,  possibly  because  of the  political  repercussions  which  changes
in the  sharing  formula  might  create.
Practices  Vis-a-Vis  Principles
The discussion  in the previous  section  suggested  that there are a
number  of objectives  that can be attained  through  grant  systems. Again,
there  is  often  a  considerable  difference  between  actual  practices  and  these
principles.  Here  we  review,several  of  these  differences.
Revenue  Growth.  Ideally  grant  revenues will grow to allow
recipient  governments  to  meet  increasing  spending  needs  caused  by  increased
input  prices  and  expanding  demands  for  public  sector  services.  The  data
discussed  above  regarding  GDP elasticities  of government  transfer  suggest,
however,  that  grant  programs  do  not  always  result  in  such  revenue  growth.
An example of such a grant  program  that  has  created  considerable
fiscal  pressure  at the  local  level  can  be observed  in Bangladesh.  In 1981
the Government  of Bangladesh  abolished  one of the more  productive  and
buoyant  local  revenue  sources  then  used  by urban  governments--the  octroi--
on the reasonable  economic  grounds that the tax on imports  into a city
inefficiently restrained trade.  To help offset  the revenue losses54
associated  with  this  mandate  the  Government  established  an  "octroi
compensation  grant."  For  fiscal  year  1982  each  city  was  provided  a  grant
approximately  equal  to  75  percent  of  the  total  revenue  they  had  mobilized
from  the  octroi  in  FY 1981.  While  this  resulted  in  some revenue  loss,  more
critical  to  the  fiscal  situation  in  city  governments  was  the  fact  that  the
grant  was  not  increased  at  all  during  the  subsequent  three  years  in  spite
of  the  fact  that  prior  to  its  abolition  the  octroi  had  been  growing  rapidly
and  was  one  of  the  few  local  resource  instruments  to  yield  increasing  real
per  capita  revenues. 36
Efficiency.  Both  technical  and  allocative  efficiency  can  be
affected  by  grant  programs.  Technical  efficiency  is  hindered  when grant
programs  impose  additional  costs  on  the  service  provision  prooess.  One
example  of  such  costs  arises  when  categorical  grants  require  complex
centralized  approval  processes  that  may  significantly  delay  project
completion.  For  example,  Bhattacharya  reported  that,  due  to  the  approval
process  required  by  states,  simple  municipal  sewer  systems  required  2  to  3
years  to  complete. 37 Similar  cumbersome  grant  disbursement  procedures
36 Larry  Schroeder,  "Bangladesh:  Urban  Government  Finance  and
Management IssueJ  and  Opportunities,"  Report  No.  5790-BD,  Urban  and  Water
Supply  Division,  South  Asia  Projects  Department  (Washington,  DC:  The World
Bank,  June  1985).
37M.  Bhattacharya,  State-Municipal  Relations  (Delhi:  Indian  Institute
of  Publio  Administration,  1972)  as  cited  in  Richard  Bird,  Intergovernmental
Fiscal  Relations  in  Developing  Countries,  Staff  Working  Paper  No.  304
(Washington,  DC:  The World  Bank,  1978),  p.  64.55
were  found  in Indonesia. 38
It is quite common  for grant  programs  to encourage recipient
governments  to alter  their  behavior  in a manner  that  results  in local or
national  welfare  losses,  or both.  The grant  system  in Indonesia  provides
several  such  examples.39  One  example  is  provided  by  the  subsidi  daerah
otonom  (SDO)  which  pays  the  salaries  and  allowances  of  essentially  all
local  government  employees,  including  primary  school  teachers. While this
cost reimbursement grant guarantees a uniform  pay schedule  for local
government  employees  without  regard  for  the  financial  health  of  any  single
locality,  the lack  of any  cost sharing  can encourage  local  governments  to
attempt  to  employ  inefficiently  large  amounts  of  labor.  To  prevent  this
possibility,  the system requires central  approval  of local staffing
decisions;  however,  there is no objective  system  used to ascertain  local
manpower  needs.
Another  potential  economic  inefficiency  of the Indonesian  system  is
tied to the budget  process. While  block  grants  are  allocated  to provinces
as well as to municipalities  in urban areas (kotamadya)  and regencies  or
38Brian  Binder,  Financial  Management  in  Local  Government,  Development
Administration  Group,  Institute  of Local  Government  (Birmingham:  University
of  Birmingham,  1982).
39For discussions of  the Indonesian grant system  that all reach
similar  evaluative  conclusions  see Kenneth  Davey,  Central-Local  Financial
Relations,"  Development  Administration  Group,  Institute  of Local
Government  (Birmingham:  University  of  Birmingham,  1979);  Schroeder,  Rural
Development  Grants  to  Local  Governments  in  Asia; and  The  World  Bank,
"Indonesia:  Public  Resource  Management  Study,  Local  Government  Finance
Sector  Report,"  Urban  and  Water  Supply  Division,  Projects  Department,  East
Asia and Pacific  Regional  Office,  mimeo (Washington,  DC: The World Bank,
1987).56
districts  (kabupaten)  in the  rural  areas,  prior  approval  of the  projects  to
be  undertaken  must  be obtained  from higher levels  of government.  Even
though  disapproval  is not  common,  the process  does  permit  local  choices  to
be subverted.
As is the case in many  developing countries, the Government  of
Indonesia  is concerned  that localities  do not allocate  optimal  amounts  of
funds to maintenance  of capital  facilities  and have attempted  to use the
grant program  to overcome  these  perceived  misallocations. The approach
used  has been  to mandate  that a portion  of the  block  grant  be allocated  to
maintain facilities.  One kabupatan official admitted  to this author,
however,  that the "maintenance"  project  in its 1987  budget  did  not differ
substantially  from any of the other projects which were predominately
designed  to  reconstruct  poorly  maintained  rural  roads.  Hence,  the  mandate
is essentially  ineffective.  Again,  one  might  suspect  that  the  considerable
reliance  upon  grant  funding  and the  expectation  that it will  continue  into
the  future does not  encourage local  officials  to take a longer  term
perspective  on development  project  operation  and  maintenance.
Equalization.  In spite  of the  considerable  rhetoric  regarding  the
use of grants  for equalization  purposes,  actual practices  do not always
produce the apparent goals.  In part,  this is probably due to the
difficulties  in defining  the  meaning  of equalization  mentioned  previously;
it can also be attributable  to the lack of appropriate  data  for  measuring
such redistributional criteria; finally,  it may also be traceable  to
political  factors  that  interfere  with  systematic  allocations  of  transfers.57
One  such  example  of  seemingly  unintended  redistributional
consequences  of grant  allocations  has been cited  in India.  Two different
groups play important roles in the distribution  of resources  from the
center  to  state  governments--the  Finance  Commission  and  the  Planning
Commission.  The former group recommends the method by which central
government  taxes  are  to be  shared  with  the  states  as  well  as how  grants-in-
aid  as specified  under  Article  275  of the  Constitution  are to be  allocated
across  states.  The  Planning  Commission  decides  on  the  state-wise
allocation  of  loans  and  grants  carried  out  under  the  national  plan  and  for
central-government  sponsored  projects.  A  recent  analysis  considered  the
per  capita  allocations  across  states  made  by  each  group  in  1960-61,  1970-71
and  1980-81  and  compared  them  with  per  capita  incomes.  While  none  of
the comparisorns  Pe-vealed  an  exact  correspondence  of  higher  per  capita
grants  flowing  to  higher  income  states,  there  were  numerous  instances  where
obviously  wealthier  jurisdictions  were  treated  much  mo-e  favorably  than
were  low  income  areas.  In  part  this  was attributed  to the long-standing
concern  by the Finance Commission  that one primary determinant  of the
allocation  of tax shares  be based  upon the  site  of collection  of the  tax.
This,  as was noted  in the  Nigerian  example  above,  results  in  higher  income
jurisdictions  receiving  above  average  shares.
Empirical  Evidence
The previously  noted  examples  of differences  between  actual  practices
40P.K. Bhargava,  "Transfers  from the  Center  to the States  in India,"
Asian  Survey,  Vol.  XXIV (June  1984),  pp.  665-687.58
regarding intergovernmental  grants and the principles underlying  their
usage  are based primarily  upon impressionistic  evidence.  Because  of the
scarcity  of empirical  data,  there  are  relatively  few  quantitative  analyses
of the effects  of grant systems  on local government  behavior  or on the
equalization  effects  of grants. The  balance  of this  section  considers  the
findings of several recent studies that have provided  some empirical
evidence  of these  effects.
Distributional  Characteristics  of  Grants.  Formula-based grant
schemes  commonly  include  population  as  one  determinant  of  the  allocation  of
the  grant  monies.  Yet  other  variables  in  the  formula  or  other  nonspecified
characteristics in nonformula based  allocation  methods  may result in
distributions  which provide  relatively  greater  amounts  of grant  flows to
larger  or  smaller  Jurisdictions.  Several  stujdlts  have  innlurlded  analyVsp_s  nof
whether  per  capita  grants  are  positively  or  negatively  correlated  with
population  size.  A  zero  correlation  would  result  if  equal  per  capita
grants  were  provided  to  all  jurisdictions;  a  positive  correlation  might
indicate  the  desire  on  the  part  of  the  granting  government  to  compensate
larger  jurisdictions  for  greater  public  sector  needs; a  negative
correlation  could  suggest  the  perception  that  smaller  jurisdictions  require
greater  assistance  to  compensate  for  a scarcity  of local  revenue  sources.
Rural  grants  to  three  levels  of  government  in  Bangladesh  in  1980/81
were  analyzed  by  Bahl.  and  were  found  to  be  allocated  such  that  generally
.Roy  Bahl,  "Intergovernmental  Grants  in  Bangladesh,"  Metropolitan
Studies  Program  Occasional  Paper  No.  87,  The  Maxwell  School  (Syracuse,  NY:
Syracuse  University,  May 1984).59
larger per capita grants were provided to smaller jurisdictions.  For
districts  (zilla  parishads),  both capital  (rural  works  program)  grants  and
current  (normal)  grants  revealed  a negative  correlation  between  per capita
allocations and jurisdictional population.  At  the lowest level of
government,  the union, capital grants were found in a small sample  of
jurisdictions  to be positively  (but  nonsignificantly)  related  to population
size;  however,  current  expenditure  grants  were allocated  such that  larger
jurisdictions  received  generally  lower  per  capita  amounts.  The
intermediate  (thana)  level  of  government  received  only  capital  grants  in
1980/81;  they  were  strongly  and  negatively  (a correlation  coefficient  of
-0.68)  associated  with  population.
Generally similar findings were obtained  in an analysis  of the
allocation of  per capita grants to union (lowest  level) and district
(higher  level)  councils  in two  provinces  of Pakistan.  In the  North  West
Frontier  Province  per  capita  budgeted  grants  for  1986/87  were  found  to  be
strongly,  but  Inversely  related  (a  correlation  coefficient  of  -0.78)  with
district  populations;  the  relationship  was  less  strong  (a  correlation  of
-0.43)  at  the  union  level.  Actual  1983/84  allocations  of  grants  in
Baluchistan  Province  were  also  negatively  associated  with  population  at  the
district  level  (a  correlation  of  -0.64)  but  were  positively  related to
population  at  the  union  level  (r  - 0.28).
42Schroeder,  Rural  Development  Grants  to  Local  Governments  in  Asia,  p.
65.60
In the  Philippines,  both of the  major  intergovernmental  grant  schemes
in 1977  were observed  to be allocated  in  a way  such  that  larger  per  capita
grants  were provided  to smaller  jurisdictions.  43  A coefficient  of -0.34
was  obtained when  per capita Bureau of Internal  Revenue  grants were
correlated  with the  populations  of 96  municipalities  in four provinces. A
slightly  smaller  correlation  of -0.26  was found  for the capital  spending-
oriented  Specific  Tax  Allotment  grant  program.
If  one  assumes  that  these  allocations  were made  with some
redistributional  objective  in mind,  the  findings  from  Bangladesh,  Pakistan
and the Philippines  would  suggest  that granting  governments  do feel that
smaller  jurisdictions  need to be treated  preferentially,  probably  because
of the  perception  that  less  populated  areas  are less able to mobilize
resources  of their  own.  Unfortunately,  there  is little  evidence  regarding
the  empirical  relationship  between  actual  local  tax  bases  and  grant
allocations.  One  exception  is the  previously  cited  analysis  of grants  in
the  Philippines.44  Interestingly,  the data there suggest  that,  at least
for the BIR Allotment program, allocations  of grants per capita were
positively  related,  i.e.,  counter-equalizing,  to property  tax  assessments
per capita (a correlation  of +0.27).  The Specific  Tax Allotment  grant
scheme  did yield  a negative  (equalizing)  correlation  coefficient,  but the
coefficient  was  not  significantly  different  from  zero.
%3Bahl  and  Schroeder,  "Intergovern6ental  Fiscal  Relations."
44Ibid.61
Interjurisdictional  equalization  of personal  incomes  may be deemed
even  more important  by higher  level  policy  makers  than  equalization  of tax
bases if much of the public  rhetoric  concerning  grant objectives  can be
believed. The  lack  of  adequate  local  income  data  in  many countries  greatly
hinders  analyses  of these  outcomes;  however,  there  are a few  instances  of
such  research. The 1977  allocations  of grants  in  the Philippines  revealed
no statistically  significant  relationship  between  grant allocations  and
local  per capita  incomes,  suggesting  that the systems  there  were neither
income  equalizing  nor  counterequalizing.  5
In  their  analysis  of grants  in Columbia,  Slack  and Bird  used  multiple
regression  analysis  rather  than  simple  correlation  techniques  to  relate  tax
allowance  grant  allocations  to a variety  of local government  (department)
characteristics,  including  income.  46 When  total  real  tax  allowance
allocations were regressed  (using pooled cross sectional  data) on
population  shares,  number of primary  students,  mortality rates  and real
incomes  in 22 departments  over  the period  1974-1977,  the  results  indicated
that there  was a significant,  albeit  small,  negative  relationship  between
income  and grant  size.  This suggests  a slight  tendency  for the  Columbian
system to redistribute in favor of lower  income areas, even after
accounting  for the other variables.  The two more explicit  measures of
4Ibid.
46N.,  Enid  Slack  and  Richard  M.  Bird,  "Local  Response  to
Intergovernmental  Fiscal Transfers:  The  Case  of Columbia,"  Public
Finance/Finances  Publiques,  Vol.  XXXVIII,  No.  3 (1983),  pp.  429-439.62
"need",  number  of  students  and  mortality  rates,  were  also  both  positively
related  to  real  tax  allowance  grants.
Another  developing  country  for  which  sufficient  data  are  available  to
conduct  analyses  of the  income,  and  other,  distributional  impacts  of grants
is India.  As was noted  above,  transfers  of money  from the  center  to the
states  are  actualized  through  transfers  and  shared  taxes  as guided  by the
Finance  Commission  and through  grants  and other transfers  made  under  the
auspices  of the Planning Commission.  A study teata  at the National
Institute  of Public  Finance and Policy  estimated  the per capita income
elasticities  of  per  capita  transfers  for  five  different  transfer  and  grant
programs  (shared  taxes,  Finance  Commission  transfers,  Plan  grants,  Plan
transfers and discretionary  grants) as well as total grants and total
transfers  for each of sev-en  different  combinations  of plans and income
estimates.47  None of  the  resulting  49  income  elasticities  was
significantly  different  from zero implying  that the transfer  schemes  were
neither  systematically  equalizing  nor counter-equalizing. Instead,  the
evidence  suggests  an almost  random  treatment  of lower and higher  income
states. While  one  may  have expected  that  outcome  for  the  sum  of  all types
of transfers,  the results are surprising  for the shared taxes which,  a
priori,  might be expected  to be counter-equalizing  and for discretionary
grants  which  would  seem  most  likely  to  be  used  to  equalize  incomes.
47  4 .
National  Institute  of  Public  Finance  and  Policy,  Trends  and  Issues
in  Indian  Federal  Finance (New Delhi: Allied  Publishers Private Ltd.,
1981).63
Hemlata  Rao  reached  generally  similar  conclusions,  although  using
different  analytical techniques, in his study of  fiscal  transfers  in
India.  8  He developed  a composite  index  of state  economic  development  In
order to identify  "backward"  states;  this  index  was then  used  to  analyze
the degree to which various transfers  from the center  were related to
development. Transfers  through  the Finance  Commission  under  the Second,
Third, Fourth and Fifth national plans were analyzed  using regression
techniques with  the  conclusion reached  that, although  the Finance
Commission  stated  that  the main purpose  of the allocations  was to augment
state  resources  in an equitable  manner,  "they  miserably  failed  to achieve
this."t49  Similar  conclusions  were reached  from  the  regression  analysis  of
Planning  Commission  transfers.
Spending  and  Local  Revenue  Effects  of  Grants.  Of equal  interest  to
the distributional  characteristics  of grants  are their impacts  on local
government behavior, particularly  the expenditure  responses and local
government  revenue  effort effects.  Two issues  are salient.  Do grants
result  in  an increase  in spending  greater  than the amount  of the grant,
i.e.,  is the  grant  stimulative  of expenditures,  or are the  grant  revenues
simply  substituted  for locally-raised  revenues  with no net increase  in
expenditures? Second,  do the grants  encourage  certain  types  of spending,
e.g.,  investment  expenditures  and/or  discourage  other  types?  Again  there
48Hemlata Rao, Centre-State  Finantial  Relations (New Delhi: Allied
Publishers  Private  Ltd.,  1981).
49Ibid,  p. 148.64
are  but  a  few  studies  that  consider  these  questions more than
impressionistically.
The  pooled, cross-sectional analysis  of department spending  in
Columbia  by  Slack  and Bird  showed  that "An  increase  in the  real  per  oapita
grant  by  1  peso  results  in  increased  per  capita  real  expenditures  of  less
than  1  centavo,  indicating  a  strong  substitution  effect.  Since
expenditures  increase only very slightly in response to this transfer
payment  and  by  less  than  the  amount  of  the  transfer,  taxes  presumably
fell."  5  Similar  results  were  obtained  for  other  grant  revenues  that  flow
to  these  Columbian  local  governments  (departments).
The  opposite  result  was  obtained  by  Dillinger  in  his  analysis  of  the
relationship  between  local  tax  receipts  and  intergovernmental  transfers  in
Sao  Paulo  State  of  Brazil.51  When  1978  per  capita  local  taxes  in  82
municipios  were  regressed  on  per  capita  transfers  the  results  indicated
that  "local  tax  revenues  per  capita  rise  by  Cr$99  for  every  Cr$1000
increase  in  per  capita  transfers." 52
Another  analysis  which  shows  that  grants  can  stimulate  recipient
50Slack and  Bird,  "Local Response  to Intergovernmental Fiscal
Transfers: The  Case  of  Columbia,"  p. 436.
51William  Dillinger,  "Implicit  Spatial  Policies: The Case of Fiscal
System  in Sao Paulo  State,"  Urban  and  Regional  Report  No. 81-27,  Urban  and
Regional  Economics  Division,  Development  Economics  Departme.at,  Development
Policy  Staff  (Washington,  DC:  The  World  Bank,  1981).
52Ibid,  p. 48.65
government  spending  is that  by Bahl  and  Pillai.53 Using  data  for 17  l..dian
states  in  a cross-sectional  analysis  of 1970-71  expenditures  they  concluded
that  after  accounting  for  stage  of development  factors,  "A  one  rupee  higher
level  of per capita  aid Is associated  with  a more than four rupee  higher
level  of per capita  expenditures."S4  That analysis,  therefore,  indicates
that  grants  can  be  stimulative.
At  least  two  analyses  of  transfers  in  developing  countries  have
oonsidered  both  the  stimulative/substitutive  effects  of  grants  as  well  as
whether  different  grant  achemes  differentially  affect  investment  (capital)
and recurrent  expenditures  of looalities.  Spending  impacts of the two
major grant programs  in the Philippines--the  Bureau  of Internal  Revenue
Allotment  (BIR)  and the  Specific  Tax Allotment  (STA)--have  been considered
by  Bahl, Schroeder  and  Wasylenko. 5 5 Their  model  reflects  the  fact  that
flows  from  the  two  grants  are  channeled  into  two  different  local  funds--the
BIR into  the General  Fund and the  STA into the  Infrastructure  Fund.  The
former  is primarily a  recurrent spending fund while  the latter is
generally,  but not exclusively,  devoted  to capital  spending.  The model
encompasses  the fact that interfund  transfers  ocour  such that each grant
scheme  has  both  a direct  effect  on the  fund  into  which  it flows  and  also  an
5 3Roy  W.  Bahl  and  Velayudhan  Pillai,  "The  Allocative  Effects  of
Intergovernmental  Flows  in  Less  Developed  Countries:  A  Case  Study  of
India,"  Public  Finance/Finances  Publiques,  Vol.  XXXI,  No.  1  (1976),  pp.  73-
89.
5 4 I bid,  p.  83.  lb
55Roy  Bahl,  Larry  Schroeder  and  Michael  Wasylenko,  "The  StimulativaB
Effects  of  Intergovernmental  Grants  in Developing  Countries: The Case of
the  Philippines,"  unpublished  manuscript  (1987).66
ind:rect effect on spending in the other fund.  The results suggest that
the general purpose BIR grants are stimulative of local spending in spite
of  no-cost-sharing  requirements  nor  use  of  local  tax effort in the
allocation  mechanism.  One  peso  additional  grant  was  found  to  be  associated
with  1.34  peso  additional  spending  in  the  General  Fund  and  0.22  indirect
increase in Infrastructure Fund expenditures.  Interestingly,  the  STA  which
is earmarked to the Infrastructure  Fund is found to be substitutive.
Results  obtained  by  Greytak  and Mendez, using a somewhat similar  model
for  municipalities  in  Ecuador,  differ  from  those  found  in  the
Philippines.56  When  including  both the direct  and indirect  effects  of
grants, the automatic flow of grants are found to be substitutive in small
Ecuador cities but stimulative in large cities.  The categorical investment
grant portion of the FONAPAR flow was found to be stimulative in both the
smaller and larger municipalities.
The primary conclusion that can be reached from this review of the few
studies of grant impacts that have been made in developing countries is
that  the  results  are  nearly  as  diverse  as  the  predictions from  the
underlying theoretical model  on which  the empirical  analyses are based.
The diversity of findings suggests that general conclusions, applicable to
a  wide  range  of  countries  and  circumstances,  may  be  impossible  to  reach.
Instead,  each  case  must  be  considered  on  its  own.
56David Greytak and Victor Mendez,  "The Impact of Intergovernmental
Grants on Local Governments in Ecuador:  A Study of FONAPAR,"  Metropolitan
Studies  Program  Occasional  Paper  No.  106,  The  Maxwell  School  (Syracuse,  NY:
Syracuse  University,  September  1986).67
Conclusions: Lessons  and  Recommendations
Given the variety of transfer schemes used, the multiplicity  of
objectives  and the paucity  of hard data-based  analyses, drawing strong
conclusions  and  supportable  recommendations  from this  review  is not easy.
There are, however, several lessons that seem to emerge that deserve
special  attention  in  this  concluding  section.
1.  Transfers  between  level  of  government  in  multi-tier political
systems  will  and  should  continue  to  play  important  roles  in  financing
lower-level government services.  If local governments  are to be an
integral  part  of  the  public  service  delivery  system,  grants  will  have  to be
used to insure  that the levels  of services  are somewhat  similar  across
space  and  that  local  services  providing  significant  benefit  spillovers  are
subsidized.
2. Although  the recent  evidence  does not provide  strong  support  for
this generalization,  there are good reasons to expect that, if local
governments  are expected  to play increasing  roles in the provision  of
public  services,  transfers  will grow in importance. The revenue  sources
reserved  by higher  level governments  in developing  countries  are broader
and are  likely  to be more  buoyant  than  those  assigned  to  lower  levels. In
part, this reflects  the desire of national  governments  to reserve for
themselves  the more  productive sources.  Elected leaders of local
governments  may also, however, contribute to this trend by preferring
grants to the  politically less attractive alternative of  imposing
additional  taxes  or cutting  back  services  in the  face  of fiscal
constraints.68
3.  Grant systems  cannot  be separated  from the political  environment;
indeed, monetary  transfers constitute an extremely  visible  political
instrument. Reviews  of the  history  of all  intergovernmental  grant  schemes
would probably  always find that the most significant  factor explaining
major changes  in transfer  programs  can be traoed  to perceived  political
gains  from the  new policies. While analysts  may urge alterations  in  such
programs so as to achieve greater equity or efficiency, political
feasibility  will remain  an overriding  constraint  to the implementation  of
such  policies.
4. Grants  are often expected  to accomplish  a long list of sometimes
conflicting objectives.  This  is, of  course, unreasonable  if  not
impossible; grants may  be designed to do some things  well,  but not
everything.  Matching  categorical  grants  provide  a  good  example  of  these
conflicts.  On  the  one  hand,  if  a  granting  government  is particularly
interested  in  encouraging  spending  in one area it  may  decide  to use a
categorical  grant  with  a  low  matching  requirement  on the part of the
recipient  jurisdiction.  Matching  grants  may  also  be used to encourage
increased  local  revenue  effort  to  raise  the  matching  funds;  however,  larger
local  matches  are  called  for  in  order  to  achieve this  objective.
Furthermore,  grants  are  likely  to  prove  to be extremely  crude  instruments
for  achieving some desired ends.  For example, if redistribution  of
personal  incomes  is desired,  monetary  transfers  to local governments  are
unlikely  to prove  very  effective  at accomplishing  the  objective.
5. No tradeoff  is more obvious  than in the case of the desire  for
greater  local  autonomy  to achieve  the  efficiency  gains from decentralized69
decision-making  versus  the  objective  of spending  resources  in  a responsible
manner.  Fiscal responsibility over the.  utilization  of scarce  higher
government  resources requires some fiscal controls;  furthermore,  the
previously-mentioned  highly political  nature  of grant policies  makes it
unrealistic  to expect  unencumbered  transfers  of funds  from  higher  to lower
level  jurisdictions.
6. In great part due to their political nature, grant "systems"
generally  develop  over time  in response  to particular  needs  that  arise  and
are  met through  transfers  programs  that  then  become  institutionalized.  For
example,  "deficit"  grants  may be used to cover  local government  revenue
shortfalls  arising  due to special  circumstances  in one year  but are soon
expected  by local jurisdictions. At the same time,  hard-pressed  central
government  ministries  often  do not  undertake  any  systematic  analysis  of  the
overall effects of the grant system as it evolves.  It is, therefore,
useful  for  the overall system to be evaluated periodically  and some
explicit  consideration  be given  to whether  the  system  is achieving  the  sort
of redistributional  goals sought  by the granting  government  and overall
incentives  and disincentives which  the system places  on lower level
jurisdictions. Only through  such analysis  can there be any expectation
that the transfer  schemes  used are reinforcing  rather  than offsetting  in
their  attempts  to achieve  desired  efids.
7. While the tone  of these  comments  is, admittedly,  not particularly
positive, the  few analyses that do exist demonstrate  that systematic
evaluation  of  grant  systems  is  possible  and  that  grants  can  be  used  to  help
achieve  the  objectives  of  equity  and  efficiency.  Although  the  evidence  is70
not overwhelming,  some studies  have  found  that distributions  of funds can
be equalizing  and  that  grants  can  be used  to st*mulate  local  fiscal  effort.
For such stimulation  to occur,  however,  the local fiscal  system  must be
capable of reacting  to the incentives  the grant system supplies; firm
central control of local fiscal affairs will limit the efficacy  of
transfers  in strengthening  local  governments. Hence,  the  final  conclusion
must  be  that  concern  for  intergovernmental  grants  must  be  only  one  element
in  efforts  designed  to  increase  the  role  of  local  governments  in  the
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